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GANGS, EXTREMISTS GROUPS, AND THE MILITARY: SCREENING FOR SERVICE

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We enclose two copies of a Security Research Center report, *Gangs, Extremist Groups, and the Military: Screening for Service*, which we would like to have entered into your system. Kindly return the DTIC Form 50 with an AD number when convenient. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Suzanne Wood

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Preface

The Security Research Center (SRC) of the Defense Security Service (DSS) is conducting a program of research addressing government and industry procedures for security prescreening. Considerable emphasis has been placed upon developing tools and procedures for prescreening personnel at the time of enlistment into the military services.

The SRC was tasked by the Director of Accession Policy, ASD (Force Manpower Policy) to determine potential measures for identifying military personnel associated with gangs and extremist groups and to design procedures for screening members of such groups during the enlistment process. We reviewed the literature on gangs and extremist groups and examined actual incidents within military contexts. We also reviewed the military's current responses to the problem to include existing directives, policies and procedures. Particular attention was given to the prescreening of military applicants during the phases of the enlistment process.

The report documents the strong efforts of the Armed Services to address the issues attending gang and extremist group members but also concludes that these efforts could be enhanced through better guidance to relevant military and civilian personnel. We present four main recommendations for improving the military's gang and extremist screening efforts and point to some areas for future research.

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Director

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Executive Summary

Purpose and Content of the Report

The purpose of this report is to examine the feasibility of instituting or improving measures for screening military enlistees for gang or extremist group involvement. The report begins with an extensive review of the literature on right-wing extremism and street gangs, with a specific emphasis on the implications of these phenomena for the United States Armed Forces. This review includes an in-depth discussion of three main approaches to understanding right-wing extremism, and an examination of actual cases of extremist activity in the military. Next, the review considers documented and potential cases of gang activity in the military. Throughout this review, opportunities for identifying and screening gang members and extremists are highlighted, as are some drawbacks and caveats regarding such screening.

The second major section of the report reviews the military's current responses to the problems of gangs and extremism among enlisted personnel. It begins by discussing the enlistment process, including prescreening by recruiters, aptitude and medical screening at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPSs), background screening during the pre-enlistment and pre-accession phases of the enlistment process, and further enlistee observation occurring at Recruit Training Centers (RTCs). Next, a variety of Department of Defense (DoD) Directives and Service policies regarding active-duty personnel are discussed. Here, particular attention is given to how such policies have been changing in response to the rise of problems like gang and extremist activity among military personnel and to how the different Services have approached such problems. Finally, the military's current efforts to research gang and extremist problems further are examined.

Conclusions in Brief

Extremism

The threats posed by extremism to the military are simultaneously blatant and subtle. On the one hand, high-profile terrorist acts and hate crimes committed by active and former military personnel can have seriously detrimental effects on the civil-military relationship as well as on the morale and security of military personnel. On the other hand, even the non-violent activities of military personnel with extremist tendencies (e.g. possessing literature and/or artifacts from the extremist "movement"; dabbling in extremism through computerized telecommunications activities; proselytizing extremist ideologies; etc.) can have deleterious consequences for the good order, discipline, readiness, and cohesion of military units.

A major concern is the rise of the "militia" and "posse comitatus" movements, which gain credibility and strategic advantage in proportion to the number of active and former military members among their ranks, and thus have been energetically seeking to recruit military personnel. There is also evidence that young civilian extremists are encouraged by adult leaders to enlist in the military to gain access to weapons, training, and other military personnel.

Actual cases of military problems with right-wing extremism can be categorized according to three main types or models: 1) Acts committed by extremists with a military past; 2) The formation of extremist subcultures or "cells" within military installations; and 3) Activities of lone, unaffiliated extremists living or working in military installations and communities.

While enlistee screening *per se* cannot address all of the military's problems with extremism (e.g. the activities of former military members), it is a necessary and important component of the response. However, while there is a fair amount of current screening for extremist involvements, these efforts are insufficient for a number of reasons: 1) Differential levels of conscientiousness among recruiters about identifying and denying enlistment to extremists; 2) Lack of guidance to enlistment (USMEPCOM) personnel with respect to identifying and adjudicating suspected extremist applicants; 3) Wide variation in Service-specific policies bearing on extremist activity, which complicates identification and screening efforts at the enlistment level; 4) Lack of coordination between MEPS personnel and RTC officials for identifying and tracking suspected extremist enlistees; and 5) The extremely limited access to background information (e.g. Juvenile Court records) which would aid greatly in the identification of individuals with histories of involvement in extremist activity.

Gangs

There appear to be four main categories of gang problems in the military: 1. Cases of civilian gangs and gang members victimizing military personnel; 2. Cases of gangs and gang members contributing to acculturation problems in the military; 3. Cases of military dependents becoming involved with, or victimized by gangs; and 4. Cases of military personnel forming gangs or gang-like groups, and committing gang crimes while in active service. Although there is no official accounting of military gang problems, it seems that cases of gang victimization (#1) are the most prevalent, and cases of military gang formation (#4) are the least common.

Aside from documented cases of military gang problems, our research suggests that there are a number of other possible ways that gangs can have negative effects on the military: 1. Civilian gangs may encourage their members to enlist in the military for strategic purposes, such as access to weapons, training, and markets for contraband. 2. Military gang members may contribute to the problem of gang migration by carrying gang culture and criminal enterprises to previously gang-free areas where they get stationed. 3. Ex-gang members who enter the military may have ended their criminal involvements, but the intense life-long loyalty many have for their gang could lead to a "dual loyalty" conflict, i.e. loyalty to their country and fellow Service members versus loyalty to their "set". 4. Like young extremists, many gang members may be motivated by political beliefs rooted in authoritarian, anti-democratic values and ideals, and this could lead to problems with unit cohesiveness, good order and discipline, and ultimately readiness.

In spite of these real threats--documented and potential--posed by gangs to the military, there is a need for circumspection when considering policies to screen enlistees for gang involvement. Chiefly, one must be aware that many enlistment-aged young people who were involved in gangs as youths have matured out of their gang participation, and may well see the military as one of the only avenues out of the social and economic circumstances which led to

their gang involvement in the first place. It would be inappropriate to deny enlistment and national service to such individuals, purely on the basis of their youthful associations.

Current Responses to Gang and Extremist Problems

Our discussion of current screening processes and other responses to gang and extremist problems in the military is mainly descriptive. There are, however, a few conclusions to be drawn from that examination. While the Armed Services are generally to be commended for their efforts to identify applicants with ties to gangs and extremist groups, these efforts could be greatly enhanced if relevant personnel (i.e. recruiters, Recruit Counselors, MEPCOM personnel, RTC commanders, etc.) had more and better guidance with respect to:

- the interpretation of the huge array of tattoo designs, brands, clothing styles, hand signals, graffiti, hair styles, etc., which may indicate gang and/or extremist group membership;
- the overlap--or lack thereof--between DoD Directives and Service regulations bearing on political activities, proper grooming and attire, and Equal Opportunity policies affecting active-duty personnel;
- the overlap--or lack thereof--between policies affecting military applicants and those affecting active-duty recruits with respect to proscribed tattoo designs, hair styles, brands, etc.;
- the proper policies and procedures for making enlistment and/or separation decisions about individual applicants and recruits suspected of gang and/or extremist involvement.

We also conclude from our examination of current screening efforts that access to applicants' criminal histories, including their Juvenile Court records, ought to be enhanced, and that greater coordination is needed between the various Service screening efforts, and between the different phases of the applicant screening process.

Recommendations

This report concludes by presenting four main recommendations for improving the military's gang and extremist screening efforts, and points to some areas into which future research on this issue ought to delve. Our four main recommendations, briefly, are as follows:

1. Standardize the various Services' policies and procedures for identifying gang members and extremists. The general goal should be to eliminate the possibility that gang members and extremists can enlist in the military simply by applying to the least stringent Service, and to reduce whatever discrepancies may exist between policies relating to military applicants, and those which pertain to active-duty personnel. We recommend that the strongest elements of each Service's policies and practices in these areas be incorporated into a single, Service-wide set of policies and procedures.
2. DoD should consider consolidating the various "gang handbooks" issued by the law enforcement agencies of each of the Services. In general, screening efforts will be improved if all relevant military personnel are "on the same page" (literally and

figuratively) with respect to the nature of gang and extremist problems, the resources at hand for identifying potential gang members and extremists, and the appropriate procedures to follow for determining the military suitability of particular individuals.

3. It would also be beneficial to have an electronically-accessible database of gang and extremist information which military personnel could consult for guidance on identification of bodily markings and other identifiers of localized gangs and extremist groups. Such a database could be located either on the Internet or on a limited-access intranet, and could be linked to information provided by state and local law enforcement agencies, civilian organizations which track hate groups, extremist groups, and street gangs, and queries and comments from military personnel involved in applicant screening. In this way, an electronic database could serve as an important supplement to the gang handbooks, in that it would be more comprehensive, more up-to-date, and would allow screening personnel to exchange information, questions, and experiences.
4. DoD ought to reconvene a joint-Service task force to examine policies relating to gang and extremist activity in the military, and to gain a fuller understanding of recruiting and enlistment personnel concerns about the implementation and enforcement of these policies. Our own research suggests that there are at least three main areas on which such a task force should focus:
 - a) MEPCOM policies, procedures and training. Specifically, more research is needed on the process by which suspected gang members and extremists are referred to psychological professionals for evaluation. Currently, the process is somewhat subjective, relying on MEPS personnel's best judgment in deciding whether certain tattoos or other indicators should trigger a "psych consult". A task force could determine whether a more objective procedure can be implemented and could provide more guidance to MEPS personnel on how to respond to suspicious applicants. If MEPS personnel are expected to identify gang members and extremists, specialized training shall be provided.
 - b) Local law enforcement links. Current screening of applicants' criminal histories are limited to information provided by national and state agencies. Gangs and extremists, however, often operate in highly localized ways, and local law enforcement agencies may have the only information on them. There is thus a need for MEPS personnel to have contact with local law enforcement agencies, and the ability to run suspicious applicants' names through such agencies' files. Military law enforcement agencies could act as liaisons for such an arrangement. However, exploring these possibilities was beyond the scope of the present report, and further examination is needed of their logistical and legal implications.
 - c) Juvenile records access. The formation of a task force on gang and extremist military policies could be an important force in fomenting change in this area. The task force could join the effort to persuade Congress of the need for juvenile record access, and could also study ways of gaining such access through other than legislative means. For example, some recruiters have been very effective at persuading enlistees themselves to unseal their records; the task force could study these and other methods

of enlarging the military's access to the criminal backgrounds of young military applicants.

Further Research

The report concludes by pointing to some areas which we believe are in need of further systematic research. First, more study is needed of the connection between applicant screening on the one hand, and recruit screening which goes on at Recruit Training Centers (RTC), on the other. It is well documented that over ten per cent of all recruits fail to complete basic training, but there has been little or no research on what percentage (if any) of this attrition is attributable to gang or extremist involvement. Psychological evaluation at RTCs may also be an important component of gang and extremist screening, and in general, more research is required to assess how and whether enlistee screening processes can be extended to the basic training phase. Secondly, we recommend expanding Tierney's (1998) research on the connection between gangs and military acculturation problems. A larger sample of such cases needs to be analyzed, and the research should examine non-incarcerated personnel along with incarcerated individuals. Thirdly, we strongly recommend that the various Services attempt to coordinate their efforts to determine the scope and nature of gang and extremist problems in the military. Currently, individual Services administer separate Military Equal Opportunity Climate (MEOC) surveys¹ which differ in the means and extent to which they measure gang and extremist problems. We believe that a concerted, coordinated effort to assess the scope and nature of gang and extremist problems throughout the military (including reserve and civilian components) will greatly aid in the development of consistent and effective policies for dealing with these problems.

¹ * The Military Equal Opportunity Climate (MEOC) survey which is administered at the unit level and is not service specific shall be reviewed for inclusion of questions pertaining to extremists and gang activity.

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Introduction

Background

On December 7th, 1995, Jackie Burden and Michael James, an African-American couple, were gunned down on a dark street in downtown Fayetteville, North Carolina. James Burmeister and Malcolm Wright, the men later convicted for the murders, were paratroopers in the 82nd Airborne Division based at Fort Bragg. They were also self-styled neo-Nazi skinheads who enjoyed listening to white power hard-core music, drinking beer, and reading "zines" from the racist wing of the skinhead movement. Witnesses testified that Burmeister's main motive for the slayings was to earn his spider-web tattoo and that Wright egged him on in this endeavor (Voll 1996).

Reaction to this tragic incident was swift. Within a week, the Army announced its plan to launch a service-wide, international task force study of extremism in its ranks (cf. Department of the Army 1996). The NAACP also announced that it would form a task force to study racism at military installations throughout the state of North Carolina. When these investigations were completed, the House Armed Services Committee held congressional hearings on Extremism in the Military and heard testimony from the Secretaries of all the services, from the Army task force on extremism, as well as from representatives of watchdog groups such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the NAACP. While the overall findings of the hearings were that racist violence in the armed forces is rare, and that the extent of extremist group activity in the military is minimal, a number of proposals for change did emerge. Of importance here was the proposal to investigate the possibility of screening military applicants for extremist views and extremist-group membership during the process of enlistment. The importance of this proposal will be discussed shortly.

Another murder committed by a young soldier shocked the military again about a year later. Jessie A. Quintanilla, a Marine sergeant at Camp Pendleton, California, shot and killed the executive officer of his squadron and wounded a second superior officer. Although the precise motive for the murder was never determined, Quintanilla had connections to a Los Angeles street gang. Naval Criminal Investigative Service agents have said they believe Quintanilla was acting out of a sense of gang honor, because he perceived that he was being "disrespected" by his superior officers (Jex 1997). Reminiscent of Burmeister and Wright, Quintanilla wore two tear drop tattoos on his face which may have signified previous gang-related murders or have been earned by time spent in prison. Since about 1994, the military had been receiving a troubling amount of reports about gang members infiltrating its ranks in order to gain access to such things as weapons, military training, equipment, and new markets for contraband (Payne 1994). Again, as a result of this high-profile negative behavior by troops, proposals to do a better job of screening applicants before they enlist have emerged.

Purpose

The purpose of this report is to examine the feasibility of instituting or improving measures for screening enlistees for potential ties to extremist groups and gangs, or for the propensity to engage in gang or extremist behavior while on active duty. Although enlistment screening itself is a fairly technical matter, circumscribed not only by service regulations and DoD directives but by the First Amendment, this report takes a broad approach by examining such subjects as the rise of the contemporary extremist right, the changing nature of today's street gangs, and the social forces impinging on the lives of contemporary young people. Although this report will offer some policy recommendations, its main goal is to educate those who make and implement policy about the nature of extremism and gangsterism, and the implications of these types of behavior for the enlistment of military personnel. This broad approach is necessary because enlistment screening ultimately deals with the question of who has the right to serve and defend the United States, and who does not. In an important sense, the threat of gangs and extremists to the military is that these groups have a tendency to undermine the American values of democracy, equal opportunity, the rule of law, and legitimate authority. It is thus crucial that the efforts to prevent such activity in the military do not themselves threaten those central values, lest the cure become equal to or worse than the disease. The more that policy makers and policy implementers understand about gangs and extremism—why individuals become involved, what happens to them when they do, and how they can end their involvement—the better able they will be to reduce such problems in a manner that is consistent with the very values that are threatened by gangsterism and extremism.

Approach

The information presented in this report was gathered over an approximately 12-month period. This information-gathering process began with an extensive literature review of military and law enforcement documents, agency and organization reports, scholarly research pertaining to street gangs, extremism, hate crime, and youth subcultures, and journalistic reports relevant to the military's problems with gangs and extremists. Next, queries for assistance in gathering information were mailed to over 50 individuals, organizations, military commands, and associations, identified through the literature review as potentially being able to provide further insights into the problems and their potential solutions. Responses to these queries included packets of relevant documents and reports, expressions of interest in face-to-face meetings, phone conversations about the problems, and referrals to other potential sources of information. After assimilating this new information, a number of visits, meetings, and interviews took place. These included visits to Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Investigations Unit, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the San Diego Anti-Defamation League, and the Oakland and New York City Military Entrance Processing Stations. Interviews were conducted with law enforcement professionals (both military and civilian), military chaplains, gang and extremist group experts, a former skinhead with military experience, active gang members, and a range of scholars and journalists. A number of research conferences were also attended, including the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association, and the Simon Wiesenthal's Symposium on the Changing Face of Hate and Terrorism. Related colloquia were also held at PERSEREC. Finally, a great deal of information was gathered from

Internet sites including those established by skinheads and other extremists, as well as those maintained by organizations which track extremism and gang activity.

In addition to gathering secondary information as described above, our research included some attempts to gather primary data. For example, arrangements were made with administrators of the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) to include items about street gangs in the most recent version of the survey. Arrangements to analyze the raw data collected in previous YATS administrations were also made. Also, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) was contacted in order to ensure that results pertaining to recent additions to Equal Opportunity climate surveys regarding gangs and extremists would be available to PERSEREC. Primary data on gang members in the military were also collected in conjunction with a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis project examining how gang activity may affect the military acculturation process (Tierney 1998). Finally, we have proposed conducting in-depth follow-on research to the 1997 YATS administration which should shed further light on the question of enlistment screening. Much of this primary data gathering, it should be noted, is on-going, so not all the results will be presented in this report.

Scope of the Problems

Extremist Activity

The report issued by the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities concluded that extremist activity on Army installations around the world is minimal. Out of 7,638 interviews with personnel, less than one percent (0.52%) reported that a soldier or Army civilian was an active participant in an extremist group, and less than one percent (0.98%) reported coming into other types of contact with extremist groups on or near Army installations. Also, as part of the report, the Army Research Institute analyzed written surveys of 17,080 soldiers and found that 3.5% of respondents reported that they have been approached to join an extremist organization since joining the service, while 7.1% reported that they knew another soldier who they believed is a member of an extremist organization. One could question the Task Force's characterization of these data as "minimal" evidence of extremist activity, however, given that they suggest higher levels than have been found in the general population. For example, it is estimated that there are about 3,500 "skinheads" in the U.S. (Schwartz 1996), which is much less than one percent of the population of 18 to 30 year olds. Moreover, this report only gathered data on the Army, and there is evidence that other services have higher rates of extremist activity (House Committee on Armed Services 1995). Even more important is the fact that subtle racism, as opposed to formal membership in extremist groups, was found to be unacceptably high in this same report, which suggests that even the Army is fertile ground for future increases in extremist activity. Most importantly, this report did not take into account that right-wing extremism is apparently on the rise in America as a whole, and so can be expected to affect the ranks of the Army and the other services at an increasing rate in the years to come.

Gang Activity

While there has been no comparable task force report on gang activity in the military, the report described above mentioned that "gang-related activities appear to be more pervasive than extremist activities on and near Army installations and are becoming a significant security concern for many soldiers." This statement is supported by the fact that each of the services has seen fit to issue a gang information handbook (or equivalent), wherein—among other information—multiple cases of gang activity on or near military installations are documented (AFOSI IOC/MCI 1995, NCIS(CID) n.d., US Army (CIC) 1992). The Military Family Institute has also published studies which indicate that gang-related crime is a growing concern for the families of military personnel (McClure 1997). Moreover, as with extremism, the national evidence is that gangs are a rapidly growing problem in America's cities and (increasingly) suburban areas. The Department of Justice recently reported that, in the first nationwide study of youth gang problems, "2,007 law enforcement agencies reported gang activity in their jurisdictions, a total of 23,388 gangs, and 664,906 gang members. Forty-nine percent of these agencies described their gang activity as 'getting worse' (BJA 1997). Considering the fact that most gang members are between the ages of 12 and 18 (Spergal et al. 1996), it seems likely that the gang problem in the military is going to get worse before it gets better (i.e., the increases in gang membership are among youths not yet old enough to enlist but who soon will be).

Juvenile Crime

It is important to note that the scope of the gang/extremism problem is not limited to the extent of such activity that is currently documented among active duty military personnel. Especially if the goal is to screen out future applicants, the concern must also be with the scope of these problems among contemporary young people, who will take the place of current personnel in the near future. In this connection, one should consider that while overall crime rates have been decreasing over the last 5 years, rates of violent crime and drug use have been steadily increasing among juveniles and a significant portion of such crimes have been found to be gang-related (Torbet et al. 1996). Hate crimes, which may be an indicator of extremist behavior (if not formal group membership), are also on the rise, with juveniles accounting for a highly disproportionate share (Craig and Waldo 1996). Whether one attributes these disturbing trends in juvenile crime and violence to poor schooling, dysfunctional families, the entertainment industry, or broad socioeconomic and historical forces, the fact remains that these trends have been moving upward, and there is scant evidence that the potential causal factors are reversing or even altering their course. One hopeful sign, however, is that communities are becoming more informed about, and better able to respond to, gangs and hate crimes (BJA op. cit.).

Review of Literature

In this section, a review is presented of a wide range of literature pertaining to extremism, extremism in the military, youth subcultures, and gangs in the military. It is necessary to review this literature because, as the report moves to consideration of the question of enlistment screening, it will be important for the reader to have a firm understanding of terms like "extremist group" and "gang", and of how such groups have affected the military in the past, and how they may affect it in the future. Although the primary focus has been on reviewing academic work which bears on the identification and screening of gang members and extremists, this section also examines research conducted by non-academic sources. Because both street gangs and extremist groups have taken on new strength and new profiles in recent years, it was necessary to examine a somewhat eclectic variety of sources in order to gain the most up-to-date knowledge about these problems. Scholarly research, unfortunately, has not always kept pace with the rapidly changing nature of gangs and extremist groups. This section considers, in succession, extremism, implications of extremism for the military, and implications of gang activity for the military.

Extremism

The most notorious type of young right-wing extremists are known as skinheads. Although the skinhead style began in England in the late sixties as a music and leisure-oriented subculture (Moore 1993), today in America many skinheads see themselves as the youth wing "shock troops" of a growing right-wing extremist movement (Hamm 1995). Moreover, while the skinhead style is readily recognizable, as youths become more involved in the adult movement, they are increasingly adopting a conventional outward appearance (Blazak 1996). Thus, young extremists may increasingly become visually indistinguishable from their elder counterparts. Still, there are important social and cultural differences between youths and adults, and it is important to consider these in analyzing right-wing extremism.

Before one can understand who holds right-wing extremist beliefs and why, it is necessary to know something about this set of beliefs. While the ultimate threat of extremists lies in their *behaviors*, rather than their political beliefs *per se*, people's behavior is often a function of their political beliefs and attitudes. The key feature of contemporary right-wing extremism, for example, is white-supremacist racism, which, if adhered to by a soldier in the modern military, could lead to a variety of unsuitable actions (Anderson 1996). The following list, therefore, consists of some key features of contemporary right-wing extremist ideology:

White Supremacism

Today's white supremacism is notable for its spiritual basis. Many in the white "racialist" movement, including skinheads, adhere to the "religion" known as Christian Identity. This doctrine holds that Caucasians are the true Israelites described in the Old Testament, that contemporary Jews are descendants of Satan, and that all other ethnicities/races are subhuman "mud people". Christian Identity adherents hold that the white race is "chosen" and thus destined to conquer the world and claim it exclusively for itself (Barkun 1994).

An alternative to Christian Identity preachings which attracts many is Odinism, a pagan cosmology rooted in Nordic and Viking (or Wiking) mythology. Though less overtly racist and anti-Semitic, Odinism nonetheless glorifies Caucasian world domination. Many skinheads today see themselves as modern-day Viking warriors engaged in violent, righteous subjugation of "weak" peoples. Most white supremacists believe in the inevitability of a coming race war, a scenario described most notably in William Pierce's (aka Andrew Macdonald's) *The Turner Diaries* (Ridgeway 1995).

Conspiracy Theory

As in the past, today's right-wing extremists see most world events as the result of deliberate evil-doing by an unseen hand. But while the "culprits" have varied historically from Freemasons, to Catholics, to Mormons, today's conspiracy theories revolve around Jews, Zionism, and the idea of a Zionist Occupational Government ("ZOG") (Lamy 1996). Though the idea of a ZOG conspiracy originated with Christian Identity, the notion that the United Nations, the U.S. government, and agencies like the Federal Reserve, are controlled by a hidden group (sometimes euphemistically described as international bankers) bent on depriving individuals of their civil and human rights has proven attractive to a wide range of extremists including survivalists, militia members, gun fanatics, etc. (Stern 1996). If the extremist right is more unified and militant today than it has been in a long time, it is in large part attributable to the shared belief in a diabolical international government conspiracy (Stern *ibid.*, Anti-Defamation League 1996c).

Posse Comitatus

Based on the belief in governmental conspiracy, many right-wing extremists have convinced themselves that the federal government has never been legitimate. Many therefore hold that true U.S. citizens are "sovereign", and that legitimate governmental authority extends no further than the county (posse comitatus means "power of the county"). Adherents grant no legitimacy to constitutional amendments beyond the Bill of Rights, and therefore refuse to pay income tax, to register their guns and vehicles, to recognize the civil rights of women and minorities, and to obey the orders of federal agents from a variety of agencies (Stock 1996).

Whether or not most right-wing extremists adhere to the arcane legalism of posse comitatus, there is widespread obsession in the movement with incidents which seem to reveal that the government is out of control. Such incidents include the siege of Randy Weaver's compound in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, the Freeman standoff in Montana, the siege of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, and the Oklahoma City bombing. By making martyrs out of individuals like Weaver, Koresh, and McVeigh, the extremist right has been able to attract a wide range of people who would otherwise be repelled by the racist and anti-Semitic roots of the movement (Stern 1996).

Who is an Extremist and Why?

We will now consider three broad approaches to understanding the causes and contours of extremism: psychological, cultural, and sociological. There is some degree of overlap among the three approaches, but each is distinct enough to warrant its own discussion.

Psychological Approaches to Extremism: The “Authoritarian Personality”

The psychological approach to extremism begins with the assumption that those individuals who are attracted to extremist ideas, and ultimately to extremist movements, are drawn by particular personality traits which distinguish them from the rest of the population. The term first used to refer collectively to these traits was the authoritarian personality (Stone, et al. 1993) In the half-century since this original formulation, various aspects of authoritarian personality theory have been seriously challenged (Altemeyer 1996), but the term and its implications are still central to psychological understandings of extremism.

Originally, the authoritarian personality was thought to be composed of nine clusters of attitudes, each of which constituted a personality trait associated with extremists. An attitudinal survey, known as the f scale (or fascism scale) was constructed to measure individual propensity toward extremism, and to measure the relative level of extremist orientations in the general population. In subsequent years, researchers have found that only three of these original clusters—authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian conventionalism—are psychometrically robust enough to be considered valid, reliable, and one-dimensional measures of authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer op. cit.). But while this measurement aspect of the original theory has been widely challenged, researchers have still not reached a consensus on the precise process through which individuals come to hold authoritarian attitudes. The original formulation, which focused on early childhood experiences, is still considered plausible, but other explanations have also been advanced.

Early Childhood Explanations

In the early research employing the f scale, researchers found that those who scored highly on the survey tended to share common backgrounds involving punitive parents—especially fathers—and that these childhood experiences could explain why the adults now held authoritarian and/or extremist attitudes. Simply put, this explanation held that authoritarian parenting tends to produce authoritarian offspring. That is, children raised in constant fear of physical punishment tend to become the kind of adults who hate weakness (because it “subconsciously” reminds them of their own powerless childhoods), are intolerant of difference and ambiguity, and who are inclined to submit completely to leaders whose demands for obedience are backed up by violence. Such people are thus attracted to movements—like Nazism and other fascistic groups—which promise great strength to followers, great harm to non-followers, and a structured society where everyone knows his place. This explanation has found support in studies of groups like the John Birch Society, the Minutemen, and McCarthy supporters, where members were found to have a distinguishing set of punishing childhood experiences (Stone, et al. op. cit.).

However, the applicability of this explanation to contemporary extremists like skinheads, militia members, Identity Christians, etc., is questionable. This is because, in comparison to some past periods, right-wing extremist groups find themselves in a relatively powerless and marginal position with respect to mainstream society. It is thus not likely that the individuals attracted to such movements are the kind of blindly obedient followers with unconscious desires to be led by strong leaders/father figures described in the original theory (Ezekial 1995). Indeed, given these movements' antipathy toward the federal government, one could say that contemporary extremists are more *anti-authoritarian* than authoritarian (Altemeyer 1996). Still, there is some evidence to suggest that, among skinheads at least, a distinguishing individual feature is a childhood involving physical and mental abuse by parents and other elders, and a tendency toward bullying which is rooted in past experiences of having been bullied oneself (Wooden 1995; Milburn 1995; Baron 1997). Overall, though, an approach focusing on early childhood experiences probably has more weaknesses than strengths. If nothing else, the approach begs the question: Why aren't more people attracted to authoritarianism/extremism, given the widespread prevalence of punitive, abusive parenting styles (Hamm 1993; Blazak 1995)?

Social Learning Explanations

The measurement flaws in the original f scale, as well as the problematic focus on early childhood experiences, have led to a number of revisions and reformulations of authoritarian personality theory. Most prominently, Altemeyer has developed an alternative to the f scale known as the Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA Scale). Though it relies on many of the same assumptions as the original f scale, the RWA Scale has proven to be much more psychometrically sound (and is credited with specifying aggression, submission, and conformity as the three main covarying traits of authoritarianism) (Altemeyer op. cit.). Moreover, Altemeyer has used the scale to refine the explanation for authoritarianism, and one of his more important findings is that authoritarian/extremist attitudes can be caused (or erased) by experiences *throughout* one's lifetime, not just by those which occur in early childhood (Stone et al. 1993). Getting a college education, for example, often leads to the liberalization of individual attitudes, whereas the experience of *being* a parent can sometimes lead to the adoption of more authoritarian attitudes. For this reason, Altemeyer employs a social learning approach to interpret his findings, and thus argues that authoritarian views are held by those people who have had a preponderance of experiences which positively reinforce such views, or which negatively reinforce more liberal attitudes. Going to college, for example, tends to positively reinforce attitudes relating to tolerance, freedom of expression, and pacifism, whereas a job on an assembly line might have the opposite effect (Altemeyer op. cit.). But despite the advantages of Altemeyer's approach over earlier ones, it is still of limited relevance to contemporary extremism in the American context. Again, the problem is how to account for extremists—like skinheads or militia members—who are apparently anti-authoritarian in their views on the federal government and American society in general. The problem, in short, lies in conceptualizing authoritarianism and in relating that concept to extremist behaviors.

Group Identification Explanations

One implication of the social learning approach which its adherents have not explored is that authoritarianism has less to do with personality traits than with the traits of the social groups to which individuals belong. If authoritarian attitudes wax and wane as a result of life experiences, and if this is the result of processes of social learning, it becomes reasonable to conceive of authoritarianism as a property of the relationship between individuals and social groups, rather than as a matter of individual personality. Some have argued that the problem with both the RWA Scale and the original f scale is “psychological reductionism”; i.e., the manner in which both approaches reduce the complex problem of authoritarianism/extremism to the relatively simple matter of personality (Duckitt 1989). On this view, a stronger conception of authoritarianism would see it as flowing from the norms and values of social groups, rather than from individual experiences and attitudes. Some groups—a reading club, for example—allow a great deal of individual freedom for their members, and only demand a minimal amount of obedience and conformity. Other groups, such as football teams, frown on individual freedom, and demand that members strictly follow group values and leaders. Moreover, social groups such as countries can vary greatly over time in the extent to which they demand loyalty and obedience from their members. According to this perspective, it is particularly in times when the identity of the social group is threatened, e.g., when a country goes through a depression or loses a war, that individual members are commanded to subsume their own individual needs to the needs of the group as a whole (cf. Doty et al. 1991). Thus, authoritarianism can describe the actions of social groups and, at the individual level, the more an individual’s identity is invested in the identity of the group, the more likely he/she will be to aggress against outgroups, submit to ingroup leaders, and conform to group norms, i.e., to behave in authoritarian ways (Duckitt *op. cit.*).

Therefore, of the psychological approaches to authoritarianism, group identification explanations are perhaps in the best position to account for contemporary forms of right-wing extremism in America. For while the RWA Scale and the f scale both contain a “national level bias” (Duckitt *ibid.*), in that they assume that authoritarians are those who are the most patriotic and conforming citizens (i.e., “my country right or wrong”), the group identification perspective allows for the possibility that individuals may act in authoritarian ways in the name of a whole range of groups (e.g., the white race, the heartland, true Americans, etc.), not just the nation-state. So whereas, for example, a militia member could be expected to express anti-government attitudes, and would therefore not score highly on the RWA Scale, the same individual could still be considered an authoritarian by virtue of his/her strong identification with the militia itself, or with a more abstract group like “true Americans”. Unfortunately, an alternative scale to the f- and RWA Scales, one rooted in the insights of group identification theory, has not yet been developed. Tomkins’ Polarity Scale, however, has been suggested as an approximate measure of authoritarian group identification (Duckitt *ibid.* and cf. Stone 1986).

Cultural Approaches to Extremism: The Youth Subculture

An emphasis on membership in social groups, to which much of the recent psychological research on authoritarianism points, naturally leads to an examination of groups’ norms and values (or culture), as opposed to the psychological reductionism of focusing on individual attitudes and traits. Especially if one is dealing primarily with youth—as recruiting and

enlistment personnel necessarily must do—the durability of individual attitudes must be called into question, and analysis must shift to how individuals are influenced and shaped by the peer groups they are involved with. Youth, in other words, even those as old as 30, are in a state of flux, and any attitudes or traits they express ought to be regarded as provisional, rather than as permanent and unchanging. Thus, much of the research on youthful extremism begins not with analysis of individual personality or attitudes, but with the examination of extremist youth subcultures such as skinheads.

While the research literature on youth subcultures is quite extensive, studies devoted to young extremist subcultures are relatively few and far between. Nevertheless, the major point to be drawn from the subculture literature, including that on skinheads, is that youth involved in such groups are influenced to do things they would never do (or would have been unlikely to have done) on their own (Hamm 1993). Putting aside for the moment the question of why individuals are attracted to particular subcultures in the first place, researchers generally agree that once inside, an individual youth is exposed to all kinds of new experiences and relationships which effectively transform his/her identity and ultimately, behavior. Such transformations can be positive, e.g., enhanced self-esteem, more friends, attachment to the community, etc.; but they can also be negative, e.g., increased delinquency, declining school performance, parental conflict, etc. (Wooden 1995) Whether such transformations are positive or negative depends on a whole range of factors, including the type of subculture, the community/institutional response to it, and the presence/absence of countervailing forces (Hagan et al. 1995).

The literature on racist skinhead subcultures is quite unanimous in finding that individual youths involved in such groups tend to get transformed in negative ways. In some cases, youths involved in skinhead groups have been shown to have a greater propensity toward violence, delinquency, drug abuse, and alcoholism than comparable non-skinhead youths (Baron 1997). On the other hand, the most extensive study of the skinhead subculture published to date found that while the skinhead ideology promotes drug-free and healthy living (as the responsibilities of good white youth), and that skinheads in fact use fewer illicit drugs than comparable peers, skinheads are nonetheless prone to very heavy beer-drinking, and are much more likely than other youths to commit hate crimes and terrorist acts (Hamm 1993). This study concluded that skinheads constitute an homologous youth subculture, in that all elements of the subculture—racist music, racist literature and beliefs, and copious beer-drinking—interact with and reinforce one another such that skinhead youths are immersed in a whole way of life which influences them to behave in negative ways they would be unlikely to have learned on their own (Hamm *ibid.*, and cf. Hebdige 1993). More recent studies continue to find that involvement in the skinhead subculture leads to increased violence, unemployment and delinquency (Baron 1997; Young and Craig 1997).

One problem with the subcultural approach, however, is that it is ill-equipped to answer the question of which youths are drawn to particular subcultures and why (Blazak 1995; Zellner 1995; Heimer 1997). With regard to extremist skinheads, the subcultural approach may be superior to the personality/psychological approaches in terms of being able to predict which youths are likely to commit hate crimes and other violence (i.e., all other things being equal, the skinhead is more likely than the non-skinhead to commit such acts), but it is also important to know (especially for the purposes of enlistment screening) which youths are likely to be attracted

to, and become involved in, such subcultures in the first place. At least one study of skinheads (Blazak *op. cit.*) attempted to solve this problem by conceiving of skinheads as a problem-solving subculture. That is, by analyzing the rewards that involvement in skinhead groups can provide, such as increased status, self-esteem, and cognitive clarity, this study was able to argue that only certain types of individuals, in particular kinds of life circumstances, are drawn to becoming skinheads. Specifically, the study found that white, heterosexual, males from downwardly-mobile working-class backgrounds are particularly prone to the ideology and promises of the skinhead subculture. The main conclusion of this study was that involvement in the skinhead subculture (and its precipitous growth in the late eighties/early nineties) reflects the sense of threatened and/or declining social status which many white, working-class youths feel today (Blazak *ibid.*).

While subcultural explanations are most applicable to youth, they also have some utility for understanding adult extremism. If one conceives of groups like militias, paramilitary organizations, and the Ku Klux Klan, as subcultures, it becomes reasonable to see such groups as influencing their members to behave in ways they would be unlikely to on their own. Indeed, there is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that membership in ideological organizations—on both the left and the right—affects individuals in a manner that endures long after the individual has left the group (Sherkat and Blocker 1997). More broadly, a number of observers have pointed to culture as a salient variable in the process of producing extremist outlooks. Gibson (1994, 1996), for example, has analyzed “new warrior” culture as the sensibility which animates much of the extremist right, including survivalists, militias, and paramilitary organizations. This complex sensibility, Gibson argues, grew out of, among other things, America’s defeat in the Vietnam War, the decline of American global power, and the backlash against feminism and other social movements of previously marginalized groups (e.g., minorities and gays).

Sociological Approaches to Extremism: The Angry White Man

One way of distinguishing between the two approaches just discussed—the psychological and cultural—is to consider psychology as examining the factors which push individuals toward extremism, while cultural approaches examine the factors which pull individuals into particular kinds of groups. In that sense, the two perspectives are complimentary rather than contradictory. For example, whereas a history of child abuse may well be a crucial factor in pushing individuals toward authoritarian views and behavior, we know that there are many more abused people than there are extremists. Thus, a cultural approach is needed to determine the precise features of extremism (its ideology and culture) which pull in some individuals and not others. In this light, sociological approaches to the study of extremism can be seen as a kind of bridge between psychological and cultural perspectives: Using the previous example, if psychology can help us understand how early childhood experiences lead to authoritarian views, and if cultural studies can help us understand why subcultures like skinheads or militias are attractive to authoritarian people, sociology can shed light on the social and historical circumstances which lead to the rise or decline of these extremist movements.

From a sociological perspective, right-wing extremism can be understood as a kind of backlash politics (Lipset and Raab 1970). That is, while the term conservative refers to an outlook that is basically satisfied with things as they are or the status quo, and while the term

progressive refers to an outlook that is oriented to changing society toward some more perfect future ideal (and radical refers to the more extreme version of this), right-wing extremism describes a perspective which sees the present state of things as inferior to some past state (or imagined past state) of things. It follows from such a typology that right-wing extremist movements draw their members primarily from those segments of the population which have experienced some sort of social *decline*, e.g., in social status, wealth, power, or opportunity (Lipset and Raab *ibid.*). Because such concerns are not easily addressed by conventional governmental or political action (i.e., they are hard to negotiate or legislate), such movements are often willing to adopt non-democratic means (e.g., violence, coercion, threats) to achieve their ends, and in that sense are extremist (Lipset and Raab *ibid.*).

From the sociological perspective, then, we can gain some insight into why right-wing extremism has emerged with such force and militancy in the current period, and why it might be expected to grow in the coming years. As for the former question, researchers have pointed to deindustrialization (the decline of America's manufacturing base) (e.g., Derber 1996), the dominance of agribusiness over smaller family farms (e.g., Dyer 1997), globalization and the loss of American jobs (e.g., Lamy 1996), and the rise of feminist and minority social movements as threats to traditional white male identity (e.g., Gibson 1994; Blazak *op. cit.*; Stock 1996), as major factors in pushing increasing numbers of displaced Americans into rage-filled right-wing extremist movements. As for the question of whether the trend will grow or diminish, there is evidence to suggest that contemporary young people are experiencing the worst effects of these dislocating social and economic processes (Males 1996). The growth of the skinhead movement, from being small and scattered in the early eighties, to becoming an international movement involving tens of thousands today, can be seen as the tip of an iceberg of youthful alienation and disaffection from Western values like democracy, tolerance, and economic liberalism (Anti-Defamation League 1995). As such youth continue to fill the ranks of the military and other institutions, the problems stemming from right-wing extremism may well intensify and increase, even if skinheadism *per se* falls out of fashion.

Implications of Right-Wing Extremism for the Military: Case Studies

The threat of contemporary right-wing extremism is simultaneously blatant and subtle. While extremists are certainly prone to and capable of serious crimes such as weapons theft, terrorism, and security breaches, these are the sorts of acts that would only be committed by the most militant of extremists (Seger and Eisele 1997). We will consider such extraordinary acts in due course, but it is crucial to understand how extremist beliefs can subtly and pervasively affect even the most ordinary and routine aspects of military life (Anderson 1996). Indeed, it is possible that the greatest threat from extremism comes at the level of the unit, where most aspects of enlisted life take place, rather than at the more abstract and rarefied level of the military or national security (though of course these levels are ultimately affected by what goes on at the unit level).

For heuristic purposes, it might be useful to conceive of three general categories of the right-wing extremist threat: (1) Extremists with a military past; (2) Extremist subcultures among active-duty personnel; and (3) Unaffiliated extremists. The case of Timothy McVeigh is an example of the first category: A highly committed soldier, decorated in combat, gets introduced to extremist ideology by a friend he meets in his unit; after leaving the military, the individual becomes so involved in extremism that he eventually commits the worst act of domestic terrorism in the nation's history (the Oklahoma City bombing). McVeigh thus represents a severe example of an extremist with a military past. There are quite a few other major figures in the extremist right with military histories, e.g., Bo Gritz, Tom Metzger, William Pierce. The second category is probably more common and is exemplified by the Burmeister/Wright case: Two enlisted men become involved in an underground subculture of skinheads/extremists on their base. Both become so caught up in the stylistic elements of the subculture, i.e., music, clothes, tattoos, beer, that they plan and carry out a double murder as a means of proving their loyalty and commitment to skinheadism. Though their crime was particularly heinous, this case illustrates how subcultures can lead individuals to commit seriously detrimental acts, from distributing racist literature to committing murder. Moreover, there were at least 18 other skinheads on base with them (who were also subsequently separated). The third category of the extremist threat—unaffiliated extremists—is probably the most common, and yet the one about which the least is known: Lone soldiers in a variety of units dabble in extremism, without necessarily joining an extremist group/subculture or committing crimes. Their low profile and low intensity makes them hard to detect, yet in subtle ways they can just as surely undermine the good order and readiness of their unit. The ranks of this type may be growing, as the adult extremist right steps up efforts to recruit soldiers and other young people. It is worth illustrating each of these categories or models in greater depth using case studies.

Timothy James McVeigh

The case of Tim McVeigh represents a blatant form of extremism, and the most severe consequences extremism can have for the military and the country. However, as an example of a former military person becoming highly active and visible in the extremist right, McVeigh's case is disturbingly common. In addition to Bo Gritz, Tom Metzger, and William Pierce, who are

among the most prominent leaders in the extremist right, this category would include Glenn Miller, the founder of the White Patriot Party, David Duke, the founder of the National Association for the Advancement of White People, as well as Michael Fortier and Terry Nichols, McVeigh's accomplices. Moreover, there is evidence that the rank and file of the militia movement is populated with a significant number of former, as well as some active-duty, military personnel and that militia leaders like Mark Koernke utilized gun clubs associated with the Civilian Marksmanship Program to gain new adherents to the movement (Ensign 1995, 1996).

Keeping in mind that militia members tend to see themselves as true patriots— stalwart protectors of American values and liberties in the face of an out of control federal government and nefarious foreign interests—the involvement of former military personnel becomes an intriguing and alarming phenomenon. That is, in addition to personnel and matériel security concerns (i.e., militias infiltrating the military for access to weapons, equipment, training, and new members), the specter raised by the McVeigh model is of an oppositional military (the militia movement) which sees itself as the legitimate defenders of this nation's territory and people (Gibson 1996). The militias' posture as true patriots gains credibility in proportion to the number of former military personnel who join their movement. Thus, the key question in examining the McVeigh model is how and why a young American can go from being a highly committed soldier in the US Army, to being a highly committed operative in the anti-government movement. According to recent biographies of McVeigh, there appear to have been several factors or events involved in this transformation. [The following narrative draws from and is based on Hamm (1997) and Stickney (1996)].

Basic Training—Fort Benning, Georgia

McVeigh got his basic training here, and this is where he met Terry Nichols, who later introduced him to the literature and ideology of the anti-government movement. The two were unlikely friends, in the sense that McVeigh was a young, highly capable soldier, and respected by his unit, while Nichols was in his thirties, had trouble adapting to military life, and was ridiculed by many of the younger soldiers (e.g., his nickname was Old Man). It has been suggested, however, that McVeigh and Nichols had a troubled past in common, and indeed, that if the Army had more rigorously examined these two enlistees' backgrounds, they might never have been admitted into the military (and thus, hypothetically, the Oklahoma City bombing could have been averted). McVeigh, for example, had once shown up at his job at a security guard firm with a loaded rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, and wearing a bandolier full of ammunition, which raised questions in his employer's mind about the young man's stability. He had also once been questioned by New York state police for disturbing the peace with target shooting and bomb detonation on a vacant piece of land he owned. Nichols, meanwhile, was a hermit with symptoms of clinical depression, whose brother was a well-known activist in Michigan anti-government circles. But whether or not this information could have been discovered during enlistment screening and used to prevent these men from entering the military, the fact remains that the Oklahoma tragedy had its initial beginnings—the friendship of McVeigh, Nichols, and Michael Fortier—at a US military installation. It is unlikely, however, that McVeigh would have become

the anti-government fanatic he was were it not for a particular set of events he experienced subsequent to his basic training.

Fort Riley, Kansas

McVeigh was assigned to Fort Riley, Kansas, and this is where he distinguished himself as an extraordinary recruit, achieving the assignment of platoon leader, and eventually promotion to the rank of sergeant (much sooner than almost anyone else in his battalion). He also proved an excellent marksman, and was assigned to be a gunner on a Bradley fighting vehicle. It was also at Fort Riley that McVeigh got introduced to *The Turner Diaries*, a novel which has been called the blueprint for the Oklahoma City bombing, and he may also have come into contact with militia members attempting to recruit soldiers at the base. There is evidence that McVeigh was so enamored of *The Turner Diaries*, that he proselytized on its behalf, and encouraged other soldiers to read it, which, if true, would have been in violation of DoD regulations regarding active membership in dissident, extremist groups. McVeigh re-enlisted for another 3 years in 1990, just before his Division shipped out to the Persian Gulf.

Operation Desert Storm

Although McVeigh had been interested in extremist ideas before he left for the Gulf and seems to have been mainly attracted to anti-gun-control rhetoric, he was not yet himself an anti-government extremist. He served faithfully and enthusiastically in combat against the Iraqis, and earned eight decorations, including the Army commendation medal and the Bronze Star. But some have argued that certain experiences McVeigh had during Operation Desert Storm led him to begin to question the legitimacy of the US government. He was involved, for example, in a roll-up operation, where hundreds of Iraqi troops were buried alive in their trenches (Hamm op. cit.). He also witnessed "the slaughter of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians on the Basra Road" (Hamm 97:148), an event which McVeigh's commanding officer, Captain Terry Guild, described as "terrible" and "deeply affect[ing]". Eventually, McVeigh would file for compensation for Gulf War Syndrome, which suggests that, in retrospect at least, he did not regard his combat experiences in wholly patriotic or positive terms. It has also been suggested that the War's abrupt end left McVeigh with a "postwar hangover" (David Hackworth, quoted in Hamm p. 150), or, in McVeigh's words: "you're way up and then it's way down when it's over." Although McVeigh himself has denied it, the real turning point perhaps came when the soldier returned to the States and attempted to join the Green Berets.

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

McVeigh seems to have had a life-long dream of being a Green Beret, and after his commendable service in the Gulf, he seemed to be an excellent candidate. However, after only 2 days in the assessment and selection course at Fort Bragg, McVeigh sent a letter of resignation to his company commander explaining that he was not "physically ready" for the demanding tests. McVeigh confided to friends that the 4 months he had spent in the Gulf had left him physically and mentally unprepared for the grueling training and testing of the Special Operations Forces (SOF). But whether this failure precipitated McVeigh's turn toward fanatical anti-government paranoia and extremism, or whether it reflected his growing disaffection from the military, he

returned to Fort Riley with a mind-set much different from the one he had left with. Army friends report that he began to carry a gun with him at all times, and would talk "for hours about distrusting the government and having...a bunker...loaded with food, ammunition and weapons...to be ready if the Apocalypse hit." (Sheffield Anderson, quoted in Hamm, p.151). Soon, McVeigh moved off base into a private home, became socially isolated and increasingly paranoid, and at the end of 1991, submitted a letter of resignation to his company commander.

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

After leaving the military, McVeigh attempted to return to his home life in upstate New York. Letters he wrote to the local newspaper at that time show that he was a restless and angry young man with apocalyptic fears. Eventually, he reconnected with Terry Nichols, and began to roam the country in his car, sometimes visiting Nichols' farm, and other times appearing at gun shows to hawk military surplus and copies of *The Turner Diaries*. Between spending time with Nichols and Nichols' brother (an anti-government fanatic), and associating with gun show vendors and patrons, McVeigh drifted deeper and deeper into the anti-government movement. He appears to have begun to think of himself, not as a failed patriot who dropped out of SOF testing and ultimately the Army, but as a true patriot who understood things most Americans did not about the forces conspiring to take away their freedom and livelihood. When incidents like the standoff at Ruby Ridge and the siege of the Koresh compound in Waco, Texas took place, McVeigh, like much of the militia movement, felt that all the suspicions and conspiracy theories were being borne out. Like Earl Turner in his favorite novel, McVeigh apparently felt that the time for true patriots to stop talking and take action—drastic action—had arrived. But while McVeigh's earlier combat experiences in the Gulf had involved ambiguity and mixed feelings, his current mission and objective—to save America from itself—seemed crystal clear.

James Burmeister and Malcolm Wright

If the profile of McVeigh offered above suggests that a person's mental state can make him/her vulnerable to extremist ideological appeals (per the psychological approach to extremism), the story of Burmeister and Wright, and their violent skinhead crime, illustrates the power of subcultures to influence individual behavior in profound ways (per the cultural approach to extremism). Less broadly, the example of Burmeister and Wright points up the military's occasional negligence in ensuring that bases and installations maintain a social and cultural climate that is conducive to good order, discipline, and positive morale. The question in this case, then, is how a group of young soldiers could drift so far from the military life-style and values, and into another life-style and set of values, that they would end up committing a cold-blooded, racially-motivated double murder. [The following account of the Burmeister/Wright case is based on Voll (1996), Ensign (1996) and a series of articles in the *Fayetteville Times-Observer*].

Unlike the McVeigh case, there is little evidence that tighter enlistment screening could have prevented either James Burmeister or Malcolm Wright from joining the Army. Both were high school graduates, with clean records, and at that time neither had the tell-tale skinhead tattoos that would later become a focal point of their trials. Although both young men seem to have entered the military with some racist and extremist ideas, it was their involvement with

other skinheads on base and environs which crystallized their Christian Identity world view. There were, however, a number of potential warning signs which, had they been paid more attention by Burmeister's and Wright's superiors, might have helped to avert the murders of Jackie Burden and Michael James:

- In 1994, a task force convened by Rep. Ronald Dellums and the House Armed Services Committee on the racial climate in the US military explicitly noted that while race relations in the military were generally excellent, a few bases in North Carolina suffered from overt racism, and the existence of a racially segregated old-boy network. It also mentioned that white supremacist and skinhead activity was ongoing at several (unnamed) bases, and posed a threat to good order. While the report did not mention Fort Bragg by name, that base's troubled history of Klan and other extremist incidents suggests that even in 1995, it probably did not have an entirely positive racial climate. It is clear that racist subcultures like skinheads are more likely to flourish on installations with even a hint of tolerance for racism, than on those with a clear policy of zero tolerance for such ideas and behaviors. This was one warning sign, then, that seems to have gone unheeded by military leadership as a whole.
- Another warning sign, apparently ignored by leaders at Fort Bragg, was the existence of a billboard on the main road to the base advertising the National Alliance, an extremely racist organization founded and led by William Pierce (aka Andrew Macdonald), the author of *The Turner Diaries*. The message on the billboard read, "Enough: Let's Start Taking Back America." Although it is unclear whether Burmeister or Wright were actually active members of the National Alliance, a copy of *The Turner Diaries* was found in Burmeister's room after the murders, and was used as evidence of his racist motivations in his trial.
- It also appears that Burmeister's and Wright's more immediate superiors overlooked a number of signs about the dangers posed by these soldiers and others like them. There were, for example, clear indications that a violent subculture of skinheads existed within the 82nd Airborne Division (a total of 22 were eventually identified and discharged in the wake of the murders), and there were a number of occasions when racist skinheads from Fort Bragg and the surrounding town of Fayetteville clashed with SHARPS (Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice) both near the base and a few hours away in Chapel Hill, near the University of North Carolina. There was even an earlier shooting (4/1/95), when Ed Worthington, an Army skinhead, shot another GI skinhead near the base. Moreover, there were signs that Burmeister himself was crime-prone: The Federal Bureau of Investigation and a Pennsylvania district attorney had filed a complaint reporting a recorded phone conversation in which Burmeister had called his hometown police chief threatening to blow up the chief's house for having given a traffic ticket to the GI's friend. In the same call, Burmeister claimed he could smuggle grenade launchers and ammunition out of Fort Bragg. Burmeister had also been in at least one scuffle with, and had his nose broken by, a black soldier in his unit.
- But perhaps the most grievous oversights came in regard to Burmeister's and Wright's residential situations, both on and off-base. In base housing, others in Burmeister's

barracks had complained about the Nazi propaganda adorning the soldier's room, and about the White Power rock he enjoyed listening to at high volume. But while Burmeister was asked to be more considerate of those he lived with, he was never ordered to remove the propaganda nor questioned about his extremist beliefs and behaviors. Eventually, due to relatively recent military policies allowing single enlisted troops to live off base in non-military housing, Burmeister was permitted to move into a trailer home with civilians active in the Christian Identity movement. Thus having achieved a clear separation between his military and civilian identities, Burmeister began to entertain skinhead fantasies like burning down a local synagogue, becoming a Christian Identity minister, and committing a racist murder in order to earn his spider web tattoo. While Burmeister was too preoccupied most of the time with drinking beer and partying to actually act on these fantasies, on a fateful night in December, 1995, he finally did, and Malcolm Wright aided and abetted him in his murderous shooting of two black, unarmed civilians.

Unaffiliated Extremists

Although a great deal of detail was provided in the descriptions of the last two cases of extremists with military connections, it is important to recognize that the schematic models they represent may be much more general and common than the particularly heinous outcomes of these specific cases. As was pointed out, McVeigh's case represents the process by which former military members become convinced that the federal government is the enemy of true patriotism and American ideals. As early as 1983, more than 10 years before McVeigh's acts and the rise of the militias, civil-military expert Morris Janowitz warned of the distinctly right-wing, including "ultra-right-wing" political culture that was developing among former military personnel, as evidenced by the content of the *Retired Officers* magazine (Janowitz and Wesbrook 1983). Any examination of extremism in the military today must be concerned with the implications of an oppositional super patriot political culture peopled substantially with former military members. If nothing else, the existence of such a culture or movement threatens to undermine the discipline and good order of active-duty units *within* the military (Gibson 1996; Anderson 1996; cf. Anti-Defamation League 1995b).

The Burmeister case likewise represents a model of the potential effects of extremist movements on the military. While skinhead subcultures *per se* are probably quite rare on military bases, the nature of an all volunteer force, which increasingly permits soldiers to think of their service in terms of a civilian job, and allows them to maintain essentially civilian lifestyles while off duty, makes the military especially vulnerable to all the ills which plague the larger society, including racism, crime, and deviant subcultures like gangs and skinheads. Again, civil-military experts (e.g., Janowitz and Wesbrook op. cit.) have long emphasized the need to reiterate to soldiers the special nature of the military institution, and the special obligations which come with their military service, especially under all-volunteer conditions. In short, both the McVeigh and the Burmeister cases represent models of behavior which have been of concern to military observers for some time.

New Technology

The case of Unaffiliated Extremists, however, due mainly to recent technological developments, represents an almost entirely new model of extremism's effect on the military, and one about which relatively little is known. The threat illustrated by this model is of numerous enlisted troops, scattered across the globe, dabbling in extremist ideas and thus becoming the highly desirable prey of civilian extremist group leaders. As has been shown already in the McVeigh and Burmeister cases, contemporary extremist groups have actively attempted to recruit active-duty enlisted personnel through means such as billboards, pamphlets, novels, and personal contact. For fairly obvious reasons, young militarily-trained soldiers are attractive prospective members to extremist group leaders. Unfortunately, recent technologies associated with the internet and the World Wide Web provide recruiting resources for extremists which are more efficient and effective than any of the methods used in the past (Anti-Defamation League 1996b). Computer communications technologies like internet relay channels (IRCs), Usenet chat lines and bulletin boards, and websites and webpages allow extremists to reach prospective recruits in ways which are not easily detectable by military leaders or even by young enlistees themselves. The extremist propaganda is often ingeniously disguised as "patriotism", or as "entertainment," or as "uncensored truth." In some cases, the propaganda is linked with more innocuous sites, such as those devoted to punk or hardcore music, so that youth can be lured in on the basis of their entertainment or recreational tastes. So while we have some reliable information on the extent of *formal* extremist activity in the military (e.g., the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activity), there really is no information on the extent to which enlistees have come into contact with this kind of computer-based propaganda.

Thus, it is difficult if not impossible at this point to present a case study of the Unaffiliated Extremist model. What can be offered, however, are some apparent examples of military personnel dabbling in extremism on the internet. These examples were encountered through our own research on extremist groups' efforts to recruit military personnel through the kinds of computer resources described above. Based on the premise that extremist recruiters themselves might have valuable knowledge about how to identify individuals with extremist proclivities (knowledge which would clearly be useful for the purposes of enlistee screening), we examined extremist-oriented websites, bulletin boards, IRCs, etc., to see if we could glean some of this knowledge ourselves. Surprisingly, we encountered a number of cases of apparent military personnel engaging in discussions with other apparent extremists (the nature of computerized communications makes it difficult to tell if users' on-line identities correspond to real life).

Internet Bulletin Boards

Two cases were encountered on a bulletin board included in a website devoted to ska and Oi! music. While both these genres of music were largely developed in multi-ethnic, working-class communities in London, and are popular among a wide range of youths, the skinhead subculture has attempted to claim ska, and especially Oi! music as its own. Recently, a musical genre known as White Power rock has emerged as a potent expression of the growth of the racist skinhead movement and right-wing extremism. It should also be noted that skinheads are themselves divided into racial and anti-racist factions. Thus, on this particular bulletin board,

postings from a wide variety of youths, some of whom are strongly ideologically opposed to one another, were mingled together. Most of the postings amount to personal ads wherein the sender describes some relevant details about him/herself in the hopes that connections will be made with sympathetic readers. In the following case, for example, it is clear that the sender is looking for connections, but it is unclear how extremist or even ideological he is:

September 24, 1997

Oi! [skinhead word for 'hi']

I'm a single skin[head] from Cali, recently located to NC. Yes I'm a Marine, but I don't act the part. I'm looking for any response from male or female, kinda boring here on base, and there's not that many skins in the Marines. I used to be real active in the lifestyle, kind of simmered down a bit though, trying to get back into it. Drop me a line if your in the NC area.

There are several interesting pieces of information included in this posting. Mainly, it illustrates a potential means through which extremist organizations can learn about military personnel who might be good candidates for recruitment to their movement. This Marine is clearly bored and lonely, and furthermore has experience as a "skin" (skinhead)—though it is not clear what his ideological leanings might be—and thus might be relatively easy to recruit into right-wing extremism. This posting also suggests that while there may not be very many skinheads in the Marines, there may be at least a few. The next posting to be examined, from the same source, contains more insidious information:

July 4, 1997

Oi! 22yr. old male skinhead in the army looking for people to write to (yes, letters from birds [skinhead girls] are always appreciated). Bands: skrewdriver, no remorse, blitz, kicker boys, midtown bootboys, combat 84, brutal attack, freikorps, etc... no rudies or ska fans whatsoever please....

What distinguishes this posting from the last is that the sender, by listing the bands he prefers, identifies himself as a racist skinhead, probably with violent inclinations. Moreover, his specification that no "rudies or ska fans" ("rudies" is short for "rude boys" which refers to a black Jamaican subculture, and "ska" is a reggae-based multi-ethnic musical genre) need contact the sender, further indicates his racial sympathies (if not antipathies). Such information could be very valuable to an extremist organizer like Tom Metzger (White Aryan Resistance), who has publicly expressed his desire to recruit young racialist skinheads into his movement (as "shock troops") and who has a history of enticing military personnel into his violently racist organizations.

Internet Relay Channels

In any case, the overall point to be made about these personal ads is that they reflect the ways in which communications technology can problematize the manner in which concepts like group membership and active participation are understood. Most of the DoD directives and service regulations pertaining to the participation of active-duty personnel in extremist

organizations were written well before such technology was developed (see below) and thus leave quite a bit of ambiguity about postings like the ones above. For example, do such postings constitute "active" or "passive" participation? Can they even be considered participation in extremism at all, given their ostensibly innocuous nature? To what extent should usage of the internet be considered a security issue, in terms of the exchange of information between military personnel and dissident political groups and individuals? Should extremist groups which exist only in cyberspace as virtual communities be as off-limits to military personnel as organizations which hold face-to-face meetings? If the military is concerned about the participation of its personnel in deviant subcultures like gangs and skinheads, what should its policy be toward participation in virtual subcultures? The following example partially illustrates how an on-line discussion group (or IRC) can resemble an on-base subculture (such as the skinheads formerly at Ft. Bragg), in the sense that peer influences can be strong and an us-versus-them mentality can develop. (The excerpt was edited somewhat for readability, but most typing errors were not corrected. Words in brackets are the on-line names of the discussants.):

<USMarine> Does anyone of you know if a superior officer found white racialist publications on me would I be subject to discharge of the marine corps?
<Freedom88> its possible
<BoreDumb> yes, marine... probably
<USMarine> excuse my typing
<Freedom88> The only thing I know about the Military is that Niggers with high ranks have been using their power to rape white women, and when the women complain to the white officers, they do Nothing OUT OF Fear of being discharged as racists
<USMarine> isn't that an infringement on my 1st amendment rights
<Freedom88> you have no rights in the military
<Freedom88> you are a pawn of the Jew World Order in the Military
<USMarine> trust me women in the army are assaulted by all types of men in the military but mostly its black officers I agree
<USMarine> semper fi do or die...kill! kill! kill!
<Freedom88> try to get honorable discharge, and go back to college for computer science, the military doesn't care about you, you are a pawn to them
<USMarine> freedom88 but the marine corp trains you to be a killer and all racialists need to learn that
<Freedom88> very true
<USMarine> I think alot of white racialists should join the marines
<Wiking88> are you trained already?
<USMarine> scartlet88 I asked if a superior officer found white racialist publications on me would I be subject to discharge
<USMarine> I am sure I would
<Freedom88> you most likely would USMarine
<USMarine> again sorry for my typing but my key board is not the best
<MintGirl> USMARINE.....are you trying to get out?
<USMarine> no I am not trying to get out
<MintGirl> okie

<USMarine> I value if nothing else the training I get
<MintGirl> i see
<MintGirl> where you stationed?
<Freedom88> USMarine, you are physically fit, but are you intellectually fit? Consider having the marines pay for you to go through college,
<USMarine> mintgirl I am not going to disclose information on myself
<USMarine> for my own protection
<Freedom88> Education is the most important thing for our movement
<Excidium> yes
<Excidium> that is correct
<Freedom88> good idea marine

Implications of Gang Activity for the Military: Cases and Scenarios

For the purposes of this report, a detailed review of the research literature on street gangs will not be presented. While it was deemed appropriate to provide such a review of the literature on extremism, there are three main reasons for not doing so with the gang literature: 1. The gang research literature is so vast that it would be impossible to review it, even summarily, in the space of this report. 2. The phenomenon of street gangs is so multifaceted and varied that it cannot be easily broken down into components such as psychological, cultural, and sociological aspects. 3. There are many published reviews and synopses of the street gang literature, including the "Gang Information Handbooks" produced by each of the armed services, and another need not be reproduced here.

Instead, this section of this report will be relatively narrowly focused on the connection between street gangs and the military. There are three general areas that will be addressed: 1. Documented cases of gang activity in the military; 2. Possible scenarios of gang activity in the military; 3. Some caveats regarding the gang problem.

Documented Gang Activity in the Military

In addressing the military's gang problem(s), it is important to recognize that there are a variety of distinct ways in which gangs and gang members have had adverse effects on military operations. One might imagine, for example, that the major problem involves military personnel organizing themselves into gangs or gang-like groups, and proceeding to commit gang-style crimes. In fact, documented cases of this sort are quite rare. As was previously mentioned, there is no official accounting of the scope and nature of the military's gang problems, but it is possible to suggest a provisional taxonomy based on scattered journalistic and law enforcement reports:

1. Gang Victimization: The most serious manifestation of the gang problem seems to involve civilian gangs and gang members inflicting crime and/or violence on military personnel who are not themselves gang members. There have been quite a few cases of drive-by shootings directed at military personnel and/or installations, of off-duty military personnel being assaulted and/or murdered by civilian gangs, and of military personnel and their families being victimized by gang crime.
2. Acculturation Problems: Another common problem, it seems, involves former gang members (or other youthful delinquents) entering the military and, for whatever reason, relapsing into their deviant/criminal behavior. In most such cases, however, the misbehavior of these recruits is not itself gang-related, and their former gang involvements are of only incidental concern.
3. Military Families: Thirdly, there has been a lot of attention paid to how gang problems affect the dependents of military personnel, and there is evidence of a good deal of concern about this issue.

4. Gang Formation: Finally, there have been a small number of documented cases where military personnel formed gangs or resumed previous gang associations, and then committed gang-related crimes in military and/or civilian communities. We will now consider each of these four categories of documented gang problems in depth.

Gang Victimization

The United States Air Force (USAF) has published two editions of *Street Gangs: The Air Force Connection* (AFOSI 1995). In the 1995 edition, the section headed "Recent Air Force Gang Related Incidents" lists 27 cases of documented and suspected gang activity over an approximately 3-year period. Of these 27 cases, 15 can be categorized as incidents involving the victimization of military personnel by civilian gangs or gang members. Similarly, the *Gang Information Handbook* published by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS n.d.) lists 27 gang-related incidents bearing on the Department of the Navy (DoN), and 14 of these were cases of civilian gangs victimizing Navy personnel or dependents. In fact, this Handbook points out that, "The biggest direct effect gangs have on DoN personnel and their families is in the civilian community or from civilian gang members who gain access to military facilities" (p. 36).

Incidents of civilian gangs victimizing military personnel and military communities range from minor cases of threats and provocations yelled from cars near Enlisted Clubs, to serious cases of drive-by shootings and brutal murders. The USAF publication mentioned above, for example, lists three cases of Air Force personnel being murdered by civilian gang members while off base. It also lists several cases of personnel being caught in the line of fire during drive-by shootings. Although it is not always clear from the reporting of these incidents whether the victim was attacked because he/she was an Air Force employee (e.g., it is not reported whether they were wearing a uniform or not), it is possible that some gang members are specifically attracted to military targets. Like some right-wing extremists, some gang members may see military personnel as symbols of an authority they perceive as threatening or illegitimate. The following case, for example, may illustrate how military personnel can be particularly vulnerable to civilian gang violence:

July, 1992, Keesler AFB, MS

A USAF member was murdered by two suspected gang members after being robbed at a local ATM. Investigation disclosed this was a crime of opportunity. The perpetrators, who were juveniles, were "joyriding" when they spotted the USAF member at an ATM. They forced her to withdraw money for them at gun point then fatally shot her[AFOSI 1995:10].

Aside from cases of violent victimization of military personnel, gangs and gang members have also perpetrated property crimes against the military. While there have been some high-profile cases of weapons and explosives being smuggled out of the military and into the hands of gang members, these incidents involved active-duty personnel and will thus be described under "Gang Formation" below. For the most part, property crimes committed by gang members against the military have been limited to putting gang graffiti on military property, other forms of vandalism, and theft of property (e.g., cars, cash, electronics equipment, etc.) from military personnel.

Acculturation Problems

Broadly speaking, acculturation refers to the ability of recruits to adapt to the demands of their military careers, and to adhere to the norms and values of military life. The vast majority of new recruits probably experience acculturation problems of one kind or another. Still, as has been suggested, there are certain kinds of acculturation problems which are particularly likely to cause or exacerbate military gang problem(s). A number of military gang incidents, for example, have involved civilian gang members selling drugs to military personnel, and in some cases, altercations and other violence have erupted in connection with drug sales. Less seriously, gang incidents have been reported which merely entailed military personnel being seen with gang members who were presumably the pre-service friends of the recruit(s). In more serious incidents of this type, military members have been involved in gang violence because they were with their civilian gang member friends during a gang-related violent incident.

Alternatively, acculturation problems relevant to the gang problem include cases where military personnel who were involved with gangs prior to their military service engage in misbehavior which is not in itself gang-related. This report will consider the question of former gang members entering the military in more detail below, but it is important to recognize that a large percentage of all incarcerated individuals in the United States report some sort of gang affiliation, and that even in Navy brigs, a significant percentage of inmates report such affiliations. Although criminologists have shown fairly conclusively that gang membership is a strong predictor of future criminality, it is not entirely clear whether *former* gang members have a higher propensity toward law-violation than individuals who have never been affiliated with gangs. In any case, it would not be surprising if gang members, whether or not they have sincerely sworn off their involvement in gang crime, would have a more difficult time adapting to the military lifestyle and military authority than other individuals. The Quintanilla incident, already referred to, is a dramatic case in point. But while such acculturation problems ought to be considered in connection with the military's overall gang problem(s), they should nevertheless be kept conceptually distinct from the generally more serious (though less common) problem of gang formation and gang crime commission among active-duty military personnel and dependents.

Another example helps illustrate how acculturation difficulties can attract gang problems: In 1995, Allan King Sr. and his three children (all dependents of Lisa King, a soldier in the Army) were killed by members of a Los Angeles street gang (the Cedar Block Piru Bloods). Two active-duty soldiers, Specialist James D. Mayfield and Pvt. Edgar Outland, were indicted in connection with the killings:

The Federal indictment says Specialist Mayfield and Private Outland drove the killers to the King home on the night of December 4th. The two soldiers waited in the car for about forty minutes, it says, and then the other men returned carrying bloody knives and scissors. One of the men said, 'We got Al,' the indictment says, adding that the two soldiers disposed of the weapons, burned bloody clothing and then drove the killers to a motel to clean up [Egan 1995].

Although this incident could possibly be considered a case of gang formation and gang crime commission by active-duty military personnel, it is not clear whether Mayfield and

Outland were themselves gang members. Moreover, there was evidence that Allan King, the victim, had been buying drugs from the gang members, and federal officials said that the murders may have been tied to drugs or gang retribution. This, then, was an extreme and tragic case, yet it illustrates how even peripheral connections to gangs on the part of military personnel and/or dependents can lead to serious crime problems. The victim, Allan King, and the two soldiers involved may not have been gang members themselves, but their associations with gang members certainly played a role in the tragedy. Unfortunately, military dependents have also had more direct involvements with gangs, either as gang members or as targets for gang recruitment and violence, and this will be discussed next.

Dependents of Military Personnel

The Army Research Institute (as reported in McClure 1997) recently conducted a survey of military personnel which in part assessed the level of concern among military personnel about the problems of youth violence and gang activity both on military installations and in nearby civilian communities. The survey showed that 10.3% of respondents felt that youth violence was a very great or great problem in military communities, and 17.3% felt it was a moderate problem. As for organized gangs, 7.9% considered gang activity to be a very great or great problem in military communities and another 13% of respondents felt it was a moderate problem (McClure 1997). According to the Military Family Institute of Marywood College, a large proportion of this concern about youth violence and gang activity in military communities can be attributed to perceptions and fears about how these problems affect the children and families of military personnel (*ibid.*). Indeed, the gang incident reports issued by the various Services indicate that such perceptions and fears are not unwarranted: Of the combined fifty-four incidents reported by the AFOSI and the NCIS in their respective Gang Handbooks, ten (18.5%) involved only military dependents, rather than active-duty personnel. Here is just one example:

Five members of a street gang, one of whom was the son of a Navy active-duty member, robbed a McDonald's Restaurant on base. During the robbery, one of the suspects was killed. (San Diego Field Office/September, 1996)[NCIS (CID) n.d.:36].

The issue of gang activity's adverse effect on military dependents is of course only tangentially related to the question of applicant screening. Nevertheless, the issue is or should be of concern to officials involved with enlistment since dangerous conditions facing military families could have negative effects on such things as enlistment rates, reenlistment rates, and occupational choices of new enlistees. For example, an individual from a crime-ridden community who might otherwise enlist in the military as a means of taking his/her family away from the threatening situation, may conclude that conditions facing military families are not much better, and decide against enlistment. Moreover, military dependents themselves and their associates play an important role in constituting future cohorts of enlistees. Research shows that the most enthusiastic enlistees are drawn from the ranks of those whose relatives and/or friends have served in the military (cf. Lehnus and Lancaster 1996). If gang activity becomes a prominent part of contemporary youth's perceptions of military life, this could clearly have deleterious effects on enlistment propensity and rates.

Gang Formation

When and if active-duty personnel in the United States military join civilian street gangs, or form street gangs of their own, and if they go on to commit crimes as a result of these dubious associations, this will of course capture a great deal of attention and raise a considerable amount of concern. As has been shown, however, although it cannot be denied that the military has had its share of gang-related problems, the vast majority of them have not involved military personnel in active street gangs. Roughly speaking, the other categories of gang problems (i.e., victimization, acculturation, and military dependents) account for over three-fourths of the military's overall gang problem. In other words, less than a quarter of gang-related incidents reported by the Services have involved active-duty military personnel behaving as gang members (although some cases may go undetected or unreported). Of these, moreover, many are simply reports of gang formation, with no evidence of crime or other misbehavior on the part of the gang-affiliated recruits.

Nevertheless, there have been a few serious and high-profile cases of military members committing major crimes in their capacity as active gang-members. Perhaps the most notable example was the murder of Sgt. Michael A. Allen, which occurred at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) in 1994. According to *Stars and Stripes*, Corporal Mark Jimenez (who was sentenced to 30 years for the murder) said that he and two other Marines killed Allan because they thought he was giving investigators information about a Latino gang called La Familia to which all four Marines belonged. Surprisingly, a number of other gang formation incidents have occurred at or near military installations in Japan:

In 1994, Hispanic Marine Corps and Navy personnel at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan formed a gang called Harper's Dead End. They were responsible for a series of assaults on Anglo military personnel on and off base. There were five hard core members [NCIS (CID) n.d.:34].

In May, 1995, also at MCAS Iwakuni, a group of about a dozen African-American Marines and sailors formed a gang called the Dirty Rats, which was responsible for assaults on military personnel and thefts of government property [ibid.].

NEE3 [Navy enlisted E-3] attacked by eight Hispanic males in town in Sasebo, Japan. Attackers dressed alike. Red bandannas in back pocket of jeans [NCIS 1997:3].

There are apparently a few other "hotspots" of gang activity among active-duty military personnel, including Fort Lewis in Washington, which was mentioned earlier. In 1989, active and former Army personnel from Fort Lewis were convicted of smuggling hundreds of pounds of cocaine from Panama aboard U.S. military planes (Associated Press 1993). Navy reports (e.g., NCIS n.d.) also suggest that a number of gangs—some with military dependents as members—are active around the Fort Lewis area. Fort Hood, in Killeen, Texas, has also been reported as a site where many soldiers are involved with gangs. In 1994, Pvt. Marvin Clair, who was affiliated with a Los Angeles-based gang, was convicted of the drug-related killing of a civilian in Killeen. Civilian law enforcement officials in Killeen report that they have been aware of Fort Hood soldiers' participation in street gangs since the mid-1980s, and that today, it is common for

soldiers to congregate in a town park wearing gang colors and “gangster regalia”. Shootings and fights among such soldiers have been reported (Payne 1994b).

The concept of gang-activity “hotspots” is important, because it allows one to see that military personnel may participate in gangs more due to subcultural reasons—which were described above in relation to skinheads—than due to some organized attempt on the part of civilian street gangs to make inroads into the military. That is, while press reports have contained headlines such as, “Gang members using military to train for crime, police fear,” the concentration of gang activity in certain localized areas suggests that it is really more a matter of the culture on a given base and its environs than of infiltration of the military by hard-core gang members. The article attached to the above headline did indeed go on to quote police officers who were *worried* about militarily-trained gang members, but no evidence was presented to show that soldiers were actually exporting military expertise to civilian gangs. Subcultures, like the group of skinheads at Fort Bragg, certainly can be worrisome, but they can be effectively dealt with within the confines of military personnel management policy (lapses in which were partly responsible for the Burmeister/Wright killings). Indeed, like Burmeister and Wright, many of the military gang members may not have even joined the subculture until they were stationed at a base like Fort Lewis, Fort Hood, or MCAS Iwakuni, so applicant screening would have been ineffective in any case.

Still, it would be a mistake to construct the military’s response to gang activity solely on the basis of past documented cases; it is also necessary to consider some avenues which gang activity could conceivably take in the future. Thus, this report will now discuss a number of possible scenarios along those lines.

Possible Scenarios of Gang Activity

Gang Enlistment

Although there are no documented cases of it, it is conceivable that street gangs encourage their civilian members to enlist in the military for strategic purposes. There are several (and probably more) reasons why gangs might be interested in having their members join the military:

- access to military training
- access to weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment
- access to military personnel as a market for drugs and other contraband
- opportunities to recruit military personnel into gangs
- opportunities to enlarge the gang’s geographical influence
- possibility of using the military as a safe house to protect marked members

It is interesting to note that many of these motivations overlap with strategies known to be employed by the right-wing extremist movement. One may thus reasonably ask whether street gangs have the organizational power and sophistication to use their members for these kinds of strategic purposes. That is, while skinheads and other young extremists have apparently joined the military at the behest of adult extremist leaders (e.g., Tom Metzger, Glenn Miller, William Pierce), it is not entirely clear whether gang members would be likely to heed such orders from their leaders (to the extent that gangs have leaders; cf. Hagedorn and Macon 1988), much less follow the directives of adult non-members. Here, however, it is important to consider that many street gangs have become quite sophisticated and organized over the last decade or so, largely as a result of their involvement in the illicit drug trade (Skolnick et al. 1993; Venkatesh 1997). Researchers have reported that some of the largest gangs have taken on the appearance of paramilitary-style organizations (i.e., similar to the extremist right), and have become quite hierarchical, disciplined, and business-like in their criminal operations (Skolnick et al., op. cit.; Klein 1995). Moreover, some recent events suggest that youthful street gangs are increasingly developing close ties with adult prison gangs and that, under the influence of these organized criminal groups, are becoming more disciplined, less gratuitously violent, and more profit-oriented (cf. Fedarko 1997; Lopez and Katz 1993). There have even been cases of street gangs developing ties with international terrorist and drug-trafficking groups (Mogilner 1997). Therefore, it is well within the realm of possibility that street gangs could encourage members to join the military for deliberate strategic and criminal purposes.

Gang Migration

One phenomenon which has recently captured a lot of attention among criminologists, law enforcement personnel, and other observers of gang activity, is the problem of gang migration and the emergence of supergangs (Skolnick et al., op. cit.). While street gangs are traditionally thought to be intensely local (and urban) groups, which attempt to control particular streets, corners, blocks, or neighborhoods, gang experts currently describe supergangs like the Crips, Bloods, and the Black Gangster Disciples as having spheres of influence which extend across entire cities, regions, and even the nation (Hagedorn and Macon op. cit.). Such gangs have had an impact on suburban and rural areas as well. But while gang experts have documented this phenomenon fairly well, they have been at something of a loss to explain the precise process by which, for example, youth in New York City begin to adopt the colors, signs, and modes of operations of notorious Los Angeles gangs like the Crips and the Bloods (Klein op. cit.). Undoubtedly, the mass media have had some influence on this trend, by promoting musical styles and other popular culture favored by Los Angeles gangs to the rest of American youth (Shelden 1997). But since gang migration involves more than simply stylistic imitation, and entails the emergence of actual networks of supergang activity across large geographical areas, the media's promotion of gangsta rap and hip hop style seems unlikely to be the sole causal factor (Klein op. cit.). Gang migration would seem to involve the actual migration of gang members from one region to another, where a new chapter of the gang can be established.

It is quite possible that the military could serve as an unwitting vehicle for the gang migration phenomenon. Special Agents of the Navy Criminal Investigative Service interviewed for this report (e.g., Jex 1997) outlined one possible scenario by which this could occur: A military applicant dabbled in gang activity when he/she was younger, but amounted to little more

than a "wannabe" gang member. Having never been arrested or officially identified as a gang member, the applicant is able to move smoothly through the enlistment process, join one of the Services, and begin his/her bootcamp at one of the Recruit Training Centers (RTCs), possibly quite distant from his/her city of origin. In this new environment, together with other (often rural) youth who may have only heard about gangs from the media, the former wannabe is now in a position to pass him/herself off as a hardcore gang leader. Since many military installations where recruits eventually get shipped are located in rural areas with little or no gang activity, the gang leader may decide that, in addition to passing as a leader, it would be worthwhile to actually organize other recruits, or even local civilians, into a crime-committing group. He/she may then simply transport the gang culture (colors, signals, argot, *modus operandus*, etc.) learned in his/her city of origin to this new virgin territory and introduce it to his/her new "crew". Thus, for all intents and purposes, the large city gang would now have a new chapter in a distant area, and formal connections (e.g., a cash/contraband pipeline) might even be established. Again, it must be stressed that this is a purely hypothetical situation, but the scenario raises a variety of concerns, some of which will be discussed further below. It should also be noted that the dependents of military personnel, if they become involved with gangs in one area, could contribute to gang migration if their father or mother is transferred to a new installation, and the dependents brings their gang behavior with them. (McClure op. cit.).

Dual Loyalties

Gang researchers are largely in agreement that, while most gangs are heavily involved in criminal activities, individuals do not usually *join* gangs primarily for the purpose of committing crimes (cf. Huff 1990; Jankowski 1991). Instead, the main attraction of gangs to some youths is that they promise to fulfill a need for belonging and camaraderie that most youths, especially those from broken and/or impoverished families, tend to have (Klein op. cit.). The term "surrogate families," which researchers often use to describe gangs, illustrates the strength of the bonds—bordering on kinship ties—that are formed between many gang members (Shelden op. cit.). In fact, the stress which gang members often mutually undergo—e.g., from doing battle with other gangs, or from eluding the police, or from committing risky crimes—provides them with an *esprit de corps* that has been compared to that of soldiers in a front-line combat unit (e.g., Katz 1988; Shakur 1994). In many cases, the strength of these bonds persists long after individuals have grown out of the gang life and have stopped participating in the gang's criminal activities (cf. Johnson and Cole 1997).

Thus, while there are some very good reasons (which will be discussed below) for limiting enlistment screening only to active gang members, it is conceivable that even former gang members could pose problems for the military, insofar as their enduring loyalty to the gang comes into conflict with their loyalty and duties to the country. It is possible to imagine, for example, former gang members from rival gangs coming into contact with each other in the course of their military service. Even if such individuals have long since ceased their participation in criminal gang activities, their loyalty to their respective gang brethren could impel them to a mutual distrust and hostility that would interfere with their military duties. In extreme cases, violence could erupt between these former rival gang members. Such scenarios are of course purely speculative at this point, but the military's gang policy should nonetheless be cognizant of the potential problems posed by the phenomenon of dual loyalty (NCIS op. cit.).

“Political Beliefs” of Gang Members

This report has already examined how the political beliefs of contemporary right-wing extremists, and the behaviors which may flow from such beliefs, can have a detrimental effect on the good order and readiness of military units. These beliefs and behaviors were broadly categorized as authoritarian, and potential indicators of the authoritarian personality were considered. Interestingly, there are some in the gang research community who argue that gang members, too, often show signs of having authoritarian personalities, and in that sense are prone to right-wing extremist type behaviors (Katz 1988). Moreover, if one considers that involvement in the illicit drug trade has led many gangs to adopt paramilitary-style organization (Skolnick et al., op. cit.), and if this is considered in light of the fact that political socialization is generally most salient during late adolescence/early adulthood, it becomes reasonable to wonder whether gang involvement socializes members into an authoritarian-extremist orientation. Recalling the group-identification explanation for authoritarianism, it is possible to imagine that gang members’ intense identification with the gang leads them toward the three main facets of authoritarian extremism: Aggression toward out-groups (e.g., rival gang members; non-gang members; etc.); intense submission to group norms (e.g., “laugh now, cry later”; “death before dishonor”; etc.); intense submission to group leaders (e.g., “Original Gangsters”; “Veteranos”; etc.) (cf. Venkatesh 1997).

Assuming that some, if not all, gang members have authoritarian tendencies, military recruits with gang ties could pose much the same threat as recruits with extremist group connections. Although one would not expect gang members to commit the sorts of acts associated with McVeigh and Burmeister and Wright (i.e., ideological terrorism and racial murder, respectively) (Hamm 1993), the anti-democratic worldview which is at the heart of authoritarianism could lead gang members to, e.g., distrust and disrespect members of other racial/ethnic groups; be insubordinate toward female superiors; be incapable of carrying out the humanitarian missions to which modern troops are increasingly assigned; fail to appreciate the delicate balance of the civilian-military relationship in the American context; be overly sensitive to perceived slights or signs of disrespect; etc. In short, like individual extremists, gang members—whether or not they are involved in criminal gang activity—may be prone to behaviors which would threaten the good order and readiness of their units. Although such a possibility is probably best handled—as current policy dictates—by unit commanders on a case-by-case basis, it is worth noting the possibility of identifying gang members by their “political beliefs”, in addition to more visible indicators like tattoos, arrest records, and explicit gang-related behavior. In general, the attitudes and beliefs of gang members probably should not be of as much concern as those of extremists, but military gang policy ought to take them into some account.

Caveats Regarding Gangs and Gang Members

Former Gang Members

A major and recurrent finding of research on juvenile delinquency and gangs is that many youths eventually “age out” of crime commission and the gang lifestyle (Bynum and Thompson 1996). Some have contended that this phenomenon is more or less biological, in the sense that

youths simply grow out of these activities as their bodies and minds mature. Others hold that the process is more social, resulting from life cycle changes (e.g., marriage, parenthood, adulthood) which bring new social roles and responsibilities which are preferable to, and incompatible with, delinquency and subcultural mischief (*ibid*:462). On the other hand, research on gangs has consistently noted the extreme difficulty which gang-involved youths often face when and if they decide that the gang life is no longer for them (*Shelden op. cit.*). This may be because the gang itself will not permit easy resignation, and will violently "jump out" members who want to discontinue their participation. Or it may stem from the very set of conditions which often induce youths to join gangs in the first place, i.e., the lack of alternative opportunities.

These facts ought to give us pause before we conclude that it is necessary to rid the military of all individuals who have ever been involved with gangs and delinquency. Since research shows that the aging-out phenomenon tends to occur by the late teens, it may well be that 17- and 18-year-old military applicants with gang/crime histories are on their way to becoming productive citizens. It would thus be unwise to deny the Armed Services of what may be a fairly sizable group of promising recruits, merely because of youthful indiscretions. Moreover, the military has long been one of the few stable opportunities available to youth seeking to escape impoverished and crime-ridden communities. A gang member who wants to turn his/her life around may in fact see the military as the *only* viable option (*Shakur 1994*). In this light, it may not only be unwise, but perhaps immoral for the military to deny enlistment to individuals solely on the basis of past gang involvements. Cautions regarding the dual-loyalty problem notwithstanding, the military has an important role to play in helping youths escape the spiral of gangs and violence, and in helping America to reduce its growing problem of youth crime.

Off-Base Enlisted Housing

The problem of gang activity affecting the dependents of military personnel has already been discussed. However, that problem has thus far mainly been addressed by the military as a concern of families living within the confines of military installation. However, there is another place where gangs can affect recruits and their families: in off-base enlisted housing. Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, for example, happens to be located in one of the most expensive real estate markets in the United States. Thus, enlisted personnel who, for whatever reason, live off-base, often have no choice but to reside in poorer areas with high rates of crime and gang activity. Special Agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) who serve on the San Diego North County Regional Gang Task Force reported to us that the most common gang problems they see do not involve military personnel actually being involved in gangs, but military personnel living off base who have various kinds of run-ins with the gangs active in their neighborhoods (*Jex op. cit.*). Thus, there have been cases of enlistees being linked to gang-related shootings or violence, not because they were themselves gang members, but because they were defending themselves and/or their families from gangs. So although this report has argued that the exact scope of the military gang problem is unknown, it also needs to be acknowledged that a significant portion of the problem may have nothing to do with the military's ability to screen applicants for potential gang involvements. Instead, it may be more relevant to housing policy issues.

Spirituality and Right-Sizing

Another avenue which should not be overlooked in addressing the military's gang problems is the role of the military chaplaincy. The demographic groups from which gang members are most likely to be drawn also happen to be among the groups with the highest rates of religiosity in contemporary American society (Bynum and Thompson op. cit.). While this report has argued that the military has an important role to play in helping some youths escape gang life, the effort will not be completely effective if former gang members do not have figures they can turn to to confidentially discuss their difficulties in adjusting to military life. Military chaplains report that former gang members often come to them to discuss, for example, the problems they have with making the transition from gang life, where they were treated with "respect" and "honor", to military training, where they feel belittled and "disrespected" (Olauson op. cit.; Kaprow op. cit.) This fact takes on added significance in light of the Quintinilla case, where issues of "disrespect" by a superior officer were reported as the primary motive behind the incident. Thus, while military right-sizing policy has included the outsourcing of chaplain services to civilian clergy, the role that chaplains with military experience can play in addressing gang problems ought to be taken into consideration.

Current Military Responses to Gangs and Extremism

The military's current responses to the problems of gangs and extremism fall into three main categories: 1) efforts to screen applicants for possible gang/extremist group membership or for propensity to engage in gang/extremist behavior; 2) policies regarding active-duty personnel relating to: political activity and membership in dissident groups; proper conduct and appearance in both on- and off-duty settings; and the maintenance of a positive equal opportunity atmosphere; and 3) efforts to research the problems more thoroughly through surveys of, and interviews with, active-duty personnel. Each of these categories will now be discussed in depth.

Applicant Screening

There are a number of policies regarding military enlistment which, though they were not designed specifically to screen out gang members and right-wing extremists, can and have been used for that purpose in practice. Since the enlistment process occurs in steps, there are separate but related filters at each stage of enlistment which can be used to ensure that gang members and extremists do not enter military service. The three main enlistment stages—recruitment, applicant processing, and shipping out—will now be considered in turn:

Recruiting Stage: Enlistment Standards

The standards for enlistment in today's military are at or near their highest historical level. The simple fact that most applicants will need a high school diploma and be able to pass the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) before they will even be considered for enlistment means that a great many gang members and extremists could be turned away at this initial stage. There is no way of knowing how many such applicants have already been barred from enlistment due to these standards, but from the research on extremists—especially young skinheads—and that on gangs, we know that many of them are non-high-school graduates or possess below average intellectual ability. Indeed, if these enlistment standards were not already so high, one might suggest raising them slightly as an efficient and effective means of screening out potential extremists/gang members. Unfortunately, given the current recruiting atmosphere of increasing accession requirements on the one hand, and declining enlistment propensity among youth on the other, raising enlistment standards to a still higher level is probably not feasible.

The other major component of enlistment standards—the requirement that applicants demonstrate good moral character—could also act as a good *de facto* filter against extremists/gang members. This is because many gang members and extremists, even those who do well in school, engage in activities which are likely to put them into contact with law enforcement, if not into some type of detention. Thus, a conscientious recruiter who insists on applicants' honesty regarding trouble with law enforcement or can persuade applicants to reveal their juvenile court records, could go a long way toward identifying and rejecting potential gang members and extremists. Unfortunately, again, the current recruiting climate mitigates against this kind of stringent moral screening, (i.e., because recruiters are pressured to meet quotas), and current laws limiting access to juvenile court records are also a barrier. Nevertheless, many recruiters now have access to gang handbooks which provide guidance on identifying possible

gang members and extremists, and many are making a concerted effort to ensure that all military applicants conform to today's tough enlistment standards (Philpott 1997).

Enlistee Processing Stage: Medical Exam and Background Screening

As can be seen from the earlier case studies of extremists in the military, there are at least some would-be extremists (Burmeister and Wright, for example) who would seem, even to the most discerning recruiter, to be excellent candidates for enlistment. Indeed, the most dangerous potential extremists may not be those who engage in unruly youthful behavior (and thus have arrest records), but those who are well-educated and socially conforming, yet capable of becoming committed to violent extremist ideological goals. There are also some gang members who do well in school and avoid extensive contact with law enforcement. Various steps in the military entrance process, however, make it possible to screen even the most qualified applicants for gang or extremist propensity.

Medical Exam

The medical exam, for example, provides an excellent opportunity not only to identify possible extremists, but to disqualify them for enlistment on medical grounds (as opposed to more problematic political ones). It is also quite possible to identify gang members during the medical exam. There are at least three areas in DoD Directive 6130.3, *Physical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, and Induction*, which medical examiners can (and in some cases do) use to bar possible gang member and extremists from enlisting. Most important here, is the part of the Directive, listed under "Skin and Cellular Tissues," which states that "Tattoos that will significantly limit effective performance of military service" can be "causes for rejection of appointment, enlistment, and induction" (section GG, paragraph 26). The vagueness of this clause is both its strength and its weakness: On the one hand, the phrase "effective performance" is unspecific enough to allow medical examiners flexibility in deciding whether a particular tattoo is cause for rejection of an applicant either because it is obscene, socially repugnant (i.e., racist, sexist, xenophobic, etc.), or is placed in an area (e.g., face, neck) that would detract from the enlistee's military appearance. On the other hand, though, the Directive is so vague in this area that a medical examiner might overlook tattoos suggesting clear signs of extremist or gang involvement because they are not explicitly obscene, racist, or inappropriately placed (e.g., the number 88, the Roman numeral XIV, runic symbols, Vikings, etc.). It thus seems safe to say that the gang and extremist screening opportunities in the medical tattoo examination are not currently being exploited to their full potential. Later, this report will recommend some ways of improving it.

Other aspects of the medical regulations which might permit identification and possibly rejection of extremists/gang members are the sections dealing with "Mood Disorders" and "Personality. Behavior. Or Academic Skills Disorders", respectively. Again, these regulations are flexible enough to permit a great deal of discretion on the part of medical examiners in determining which applicants might have the potential for future gang and extremist (or otherwise unsuitable) behavior. One advantage of using these kinds of psychological indicators of gangsterism/extremism, rather than relying on tattoo or background checks, is that they are in a position to identify applicants who may be *prone* to engage in unsuitable extremist behavior,

but who have not yet taken on the outward signs of extremism. Unfortunately, due to cost considerations, only a small minority of applicants currently undergo psychological evaluation, and only after they have exhibited some signs of emotional or mental imbalance. As was shown previously, however, there is evidence that extremist behavior (and possibly gang behavior as well) is rooted in a distinguishing set of personality factors which, though they would not indicate a disorder, would nonetheless be detectable in a psychological evaluation. Since the current medical regulations specify "antisocial attitudes" as a possible cause for rejection, it seems possible that whatever current psychometric instruments are used by psychological evaluation personnel could be slightly modified to include the insights provided by authoritarian personality theory. In any case, psychological evaluations, or "psych consults" are one of the most promising sites for improving the military's efforts to screen applicants for gang and extremist propensities. Some ideas on how to improve the existing process will be offered later in the report.

Job Classification

After applicants have been cleared by medical personnel, the next step in the enlistment process is for applicants to meet with a Counselor from their chosen Services so that they may receive a job classification. As part of this step, the applicant is required to fill out a form known as 1966, and another known as SF 86. The information provided on the SF 86 is intended to help Service Counselors determine whether the applicant would be eligible for a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) that requires a security clearance. In essence, then, the SF 86 is a prescreening form, and in that sense can serve as filter for gang members and/or extremists, and any other potentially unsuitable individuals during enlistment.

As it is currently structured, the SF 86 contains only two items which are geared toward identifying a history of extremism or other questionable political activity. Section 30, headed "Your Association Record," asks, "Have you ever knowingly been...a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the US Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end...?" It also asks if the applicant has ever engaged in *acts* which were intended to violently overthrow the US Government. Again, these questions have the virtue of being vague enough to cover a range of extremisms (e.g., from radical Islamic groups to the KKK) yet specific enough to distinguish extremism from legitimate forms of political dissent and action. However, they obviously presume a great deal of honesty on the part of applicants and, importantly, they might be interpreted by even the most honest extremist as not applicable to him or her. This is because, as was discussed earlier in the report, many of today's right-wing extremists see themselves as true patriots whose actions are intended to *restore* the "legitimate" US government, rather than overthrow it, and many others see their actions as simply self-defense against an out-of-control federal government. It therefore might be wise to include an item on this form—which appears on some Service-specific security questionnaires—asking applicants about participation in groups which are dedicated to *depriving others of their civil rights*. Such an item would avoid the ambiguity surrounding terms like "overthrow" and "government" and might apply to a wider range of extremist (and conceivably street gang) activities.

Preenlistment Interview (“DEP-In”)

The next step in the enlistment process is the preenlistment interview conducted by MEPS personnel. This interview serves both to ensure that the applicant is fully aware of the commitment he/she is making by enlisting, and to screen the applicant’s background to ensure that he/she is in fact suitable for service. The interview also serves to ensure that the information provided by the applicant at other stages of the enlistment process is accurate and complete.

Submission of the Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC), including the applicant’s fingerprints, is the major component of background screening which occurs during the preenlistment interview. While applicants may have already been asked about law enforcement contact by their recruiters and may have provided access to their juvenile court records, the ENTNAC may uncover information which is not kept by agencies in the applicant’s hometown (e.g., arrests in other states). However, as a tool for uncovering comprehensive information on law enforcement involvement, the ENTNAC is not fail-safe. This is mainly because the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index (which is the database searched by the ENTNAC) only includes *adult* arrest and court records, and then only if the state elects to share such information with the FBI. It is thus conceivable that an applicant could have multiple felony arrests and even convictions that would not be uncovered either by a recruiter’s local agency check or by an ENTNAC (Philpott 1997). This is especially troubling given that a clean ENTNAC is one of the main pre-requisites not just for enlistment, but for the granting of security clearances as well. That the military is aware of the limitations of the ENTNAC is evidenced by recent efforts to lobby Congress for increased access to juvenile court records. Congress, however, continues to uphold the sanctity of sealed juvenile records.

So while there is room for improvement in both of the official background screening events—the SF 86 and the ENTNAC—it should be noted that the preenlistment interview also includes less formal aspects which might be in a position to help screen for potential gang members and extremists. As was mentioned, one purpose of the interview is to ensure that applicants understand the commitment they are making and, in effect, gives them an opportunity to withdraw their application with minimal repercussions. The interviewer reminds applicants that any misinformation they provide could result in a court martial and a charge of fraudulent enlistment. One of the last questions in the interview asks whether the applicant “understand[s] the DoD’s separation policy and restrictions on personal conduct in the Armed Forces.” Applicants are not permitted to take the oath of enlistment until they have completed this interview. Thus, it might be possible during this stage of the enlistment process, to *deter* extremists or gang members from continuing with their enlistment application, rather than attempting to “catch” them once they have enlisted, as the ENTNAC is intended to do. As has been discussed, extremists and gang members may not have any kind of police record or other identifying features, so efforts to persuade them not to enlist may be as important as measures designed to prevent them from doing so.

“DEP-Out”

All of the enlistment processing discussed so far occurs prior to an applicant's entrance into the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). The vast majority of today's enlistees take advantage of the opportunity to spend some time (usually in order to complete high school) between their oath of enlistment and actually shipping out to a Recruit Training Center (RTC). After this period, enlistees return to the MEPS for final processing. Such processing includes a preaccesion interview, which covers much of the same ground as the preenlistment interview but focuses on events which may have occurred during the DEP period, and a shortened medical exam which may reveal tattoos acquired in this interim. Importantly, this stage also involves a step which Service Counselors refer to as the “Moment of Truth”, when applicants are given one final opportunity to bow out of enlistment or to confess to any inaccuracies or omissions in their application. The solemnity of this occasion, involving as it does a face-to-face interlude with a uniformed representative of the applicant's chosen Service, may convey sufficient import to deter extremists and gang members from enlisting or to persuade them that the military is serious about its policy of intolerance toward gang and extremist behavior. Many Service Counselors have also been trained to look for signs of gang and extremist involvement which applicants may have acquired during their DEP. Finally, this DEP-Out stage often includes a security clearance interview which may reveal indications of extremist or anti-civil rights group involvement.

Recruit Training Center

Although applicants shipped to RTCs are technically already active-duty members of the Armed Forces, the rigorous regime which recruits undergo effectively serves as a final quality check of enlisted personnel, and significant numbers are administratively discharged during this training period. The advantages for screening at this stage are that drill sergeants and platoon leaders have the opportunity to get to know recruits in ways not available to recruiters and enlistment personnel. Further tattoo examination, for example, is possible here, as are efforts to observe recruits' personal styles of interaction, recreation, and expression. Such observation is crucial, given the fact that the threat of extremism and gangsterism lies not so much in particular sets of beliefs, but in the kinds of behaviors which these beliefs may give rise to. Truly committed right-wing extremists, for example, whether or not they are members of an organized group or harbor criminal records, would probably have trouble working with and taking orders from minority group members. Gang members, too, would probably have conflicts with authority figures, especially female ones. Thus, it might not be until the training period that a recruit's gang or extremist tendencies would be revealed. So while RTCs are not technically part of the enlistee screening process, their value as sights of continued identification of extremists and other militarily unsuitable individuals should not be overlooked.

Policies Regarding Active-Duty Personnel

Although the focus of this report is the issue of enlistee screening, it is necessary to say something about the military's current policies with respect to active-duty personnel and their involvement in gang or extremist group activity. For although enlistment policies and policies relating to active-duty personnel are formally distinct from one another, the goal of reducing extremist and gang activity in the military requires that aspects of the two sets of policies work in tandem, and be designed to compliment one another. Moreover, the rise of gangs and extremism in the military has already generated changes in the policies affecting active-duty personnel, so any efforts to alter enlistment policies must take account of these changes. There are three main areas of personnel policy which can and have been used to respond to the gang and extremist problems: Policies relating to the political activity of personnel and their involvement in dissident activity; policies covering the proper conduct and appearance of military personnel, both on- and off-duty; and policies geared toward maintaining a positive equal opportunity atmosphere in all military arenas. Each of these areas will now be considered in more depth, including recent policy changes made in response to the gang and extremist problems.

Political, Dissident, and Protest Activity

DoD has issued two Directives which pertain to all active-duty military personnel which provide guidelines on permissible and prohibited political behavior: DoD Directive 1344.10, *Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces on Active Duty*, and DoD Directive 1325.6 *Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces*.

DoD Directive 1344.10

As was discussed earlier in this report, extremism, as often defined, refers to political activities which go beyond the legitimate channels and conventional methods in the American context (i.e., democratic political procedures). On this definition, it is not people's beliefs or goals *per se* which characterize them as extremists, but the methods and means they use to achieve their ends. Thus, running for office, for example, no matter how radical the agenda, would not be considered an expression of extremism, while using violence, coercion, or threats to achieve political aims would be characteristic of an extremist orientation. Thus, Directive 1344.10, which pertains mainly to political activities which are granted by right to civilians but which are proscribed for military personnel, has limited relevance to extremist political behavior. Nevertheless, the Directive does contain guidelines which commanders might utilize to prevent the growth of extremist beliefs among military personnel before extremist behaviors have emerged. The Directive, for example, is quite explicit about the prohibition against military personnel participating in political rallies and meetings *while in uniform*. Whatever the original rationale behind this guideline, information presented in this report illustrates the importance of keeping military symbols out of extremist milieu. The contemporary extremist right is notable for the participation of former military personnel in its ranks and for the extent to which it has sought legitimacy and credibility by associating itself with military symbols and culture. So while military commanders probably cannot (and probably should not) prevent personnel from attending the rallies and meetings of legitimate extremist groups (e.g., militias, posse comitatus

groups, etc.), it is crucial that the “when not in uniform” clause be strictly enforced so that the Armed Forces can maintain their distance with respect to such groups.

DoD Directive 1325.6

Directive 1325.6 is quite germane to extremist activities and, indeed, was amended in 1996, presumably in response to recommendations made at the Congressional hearings following the release of the Army’s Task Force on Extremist Activities report. The earlier version of the Directive, dated September 12, 1969, was designed to deal with anti-Vietnam War groups like draft-counseling organizations and with efforts to unionize enlisted personnel. The newer version, though it contains much of the older language, has new clauses and sections focusing specifically on right-wing extremist activities such as “supremacist causes”, “illegal discrimination”, and “depriv[ing] individuals of their civil rights.” The new version also addresses a major criticism brought up by the Army’s Task Force report, namely, the vague distinction made in the Directive between “active” and “passive” participation in dissident groups. But rather than explicitly and clearly defining passive participation, as the report and hearing participants recommended, the new version offers a more detailed definition of proscribed active participation:

Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, organizing or leading such organizations, or otherwise *engaging in activities in relation to such organizations or in furtherance of the objectives of such organizations that are viewed by command to be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the unit*, is incompatible with Military Service, and is, therefore, prohibited [paragraph 3.5.8 (italics denote additions to the Directive)].

Another criticism of the original Directive, relating to its emphasis on unit commanders’ responsibility for determining whether personnel behavior is actionable under the Directive, is not really addressed by the new language. That is, the revised version still puts much of the onus for preventing the proscribed activities from taking place on unit and installation commanders. The rationale for this appears to stem from the Directive’s general policy that, “The Service members’ right of expression should be preserved to the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and discipline and the national security.” Thus, while it is clear that members of the Armed Forces do not have the full set of Constitutional rights and liberties guaranteed to civilians, the framers of this Directive apparently felt that the delicate balance between good order, discipline, and national security on the one hand, and enlistees’ civil rights on the other, is best managed by unit commanders in an *ad hoc* rather than a *de jure* fashion. But while such a policy rightly allows for flexibility and for problems to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, the case studies of extremism which were reviewed earlier, especially the Burmeister and Wright case, suggest that commanders should have more guidance on distinguishing problematic behaviors from non-problematic ones. In this connection, it is worth comparing a related Army Regulation to the DoD Directive described above.

Army Regulation 600-20

Apparently, the Army is the only one of the Armed Services to have issued its own regulations regarding personnel participation in extremist groups or extremist activities. Presumably, the other Services rely solely on the DoD Directives for guidance in this area. Army Regulation 600-20, paragraph 4-12, headed "Extremist Organizations," was added to the Regulations in 1988. The main difference between this Regulation and the DoD Directive, is that the Army Regulation more carefully and thoroughly defines the term "passive participation":

Passive activities, such as mere membership, receiving literature in the mail, or presence at an event, although strongly discouraged as incompatible with military service, are not prohibited by Army policy.

Thus, this Regulation would seem to dovetail with the Directive in the sense that the latter provides the general Defense policy, while the former offers guidelines for installation and unit commanders. However, it is important to note that, in light of the recent communications technology developments discussed earlier in this report, the Army Regulation's definition of passive participation may not be comprehensive enough. Again, the question arises as to whether participation on a website, IRC, or bulletin board, etc., is to be defined as active or passive and whether such activity can be as detrimental to the good order and discipline of a unit as, for example, distributing white supremacist literature (i.e., an act clearly proscribed by both the DoD Directive and the Army Regulation).

Proper Military Conduct and Appearance

It is obviously beyond the scope of this report to review all DoD and Armed Services policies on proper military conduct and appearance. However, it will be instructive to consider one Service's—the Marine Corps'—approach to using such policies as a response to the rise of gangs and extremism. In general, the relevance of conduct and appearance regulations to gangsterism and extremism among active-duty personnel is that they provide a means to respond to the problem in a manner that is more straightforward than policies relating to political activity or membership in dissident organizations. There is relatively little ambiguity, for example, in a policy which proscribes swastika tattoos versus one which prohibits active participation in a supremacist organization. In short, such policies permit officials to deal with gang and extremist *behavior*, or behavior which has the appearance of being gang- or extremist-related, without broaching the difficult question of whether a particular individual really *is* a gang member, or an extremist or holds extremist *beliefs*. Moreover, the clearer that policies regarding active-duty personnel are, the easier it is for enlistment personnel to make determinations about military applicants.

This can be illustrated by the Marine Corps' recent efforts to amend its policy on Standards of Dress. Previously, the policy prohibited earrings and other adornments for men, and contained strict parameters for such ornamentation worn by women. The earlier policy also prohibited tattoos from being placed in certain areas, but did not proscribe any particular tattoo designs. As has been discussed, this is an area of ambiguity that has been a source of confusion for enlistment personnel such as medical examiners. So while the earlier policy was fairly vague,

Tattoos or brands on the neck and head are prohibited. In other areas of the body, tattoos or brands that are prejudicial to good order, discipline and morale or are of a nature to bring discredit upon the Marine Corps are also prohibited.

The newer wording includes an extra sentence which offers much more guidance to enlistment personnel, commanders, and active-duty Marines themselves:

Examples of tattoos or brands that are prohibited, but not limited to, are sexist, racist, obscene, excessive, morally offensive, gang related or associated with criminal activities/organizations.

The memorandum announcing this policy change also included an extensive collection of tattoo designs associated with a variety of street gangs and extremist groups to help relevant officials make determinations in questionable cases. Since the collection is obviously not exhaustive, it was recommended that local law enforcement agencies be contacted in order to supplement the list. Moreover, the new policy included a memorandum from Marine Corps Recruiting Command which provides guidelines to enlistment personnel on how the updated policy affects new Marine Corps applicants. For example, one of the guidelines reads:

Having a tattoo does not necessarily disqualify an applicant, but should be a catalyst for a more intensive screening and interview process. The enclosures and locally procured information should be used to determine the extent and meaning of the applicant's tattoos. If this process reveals gang/hate group related activities on the part of an applicant, the applicant will be disqualified. If the applicant's tattoos or his conduct is questionable, the application must be referred to the RS [Recruiting Station].

However comprehensive they may be, the main drawback in relying on these sorts of appearance regulations is, as has been discussed, the fact that some gang members and extremists may enter the military with few or no outward signs—like tattoos—of their involvement. The key innovation of the Marine Corps policy—that such outward signs can trigger “a more intensive screening and interview process”—is thus weakened by the omission of any other possible triggers or catalysts. In general, the idea that enlistment filters can be enhanced by inserting a mechanism by which certain applicants become subject to more intensive screens and/or interviews, is an important one. However, it appears that even the Marine Corps’ policy could be strengthened if other indicators—beyond tattoos, brands, etc.—could be found that would also serve this catalytic role. Later in this report, some specific recommendations on how to improve this aspect of the Marine Corps’—and the other Services—enlistment policy will be presented.

Equal Opportunity Climate

The third area of policies regarding active-duty personnel which is relevant to the gang/extremist problem is that dealing with Equal Opportunity (EO) climate. In general terms, the DoD, including the individual Services, has an exemplary record of providing equality of opportunity to all its personnel, regardless of race, gender, socioeconomic status, or religion. In fact, DoD has often been at the forefront of achieving progress in this area, and has served as an

example for other institutions and employers in America and, indeed, the world. Nevertheless, DoD has certainly had its share of complaints of racial discrimination and prejudice, sexual harassment and gender discrimination, and subtler forms of unfair treatment of minority group members.

Indeed, as recently as 1994, in response to a rising number of complaints, the House Armed Services Committee formed a Task Force to study racial discrimination in the military and, concurrently, DoD overhauled its Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program (DoD Directive 1350.2). Although the policy revision was implemented by a Secretary of Defense Memorandum ("Equal Opportunity (EO)," March 3, 1994) before the Task Force released its findings, it involved major changes, including: The creation of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity; the establishment of the Defense Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI); and the establishment of Department-wide standards for discrimination complaint processing. However, certain findings of the Armed Services Committee's Task Force on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, as well as some of the findings of the Army's Task Force on Extremist Activities, suggest that EO policy is another area where the military's response to both extremism and gangs can be improved.

The overarching idea from which EO regulations flow is DoD's policy to: "Promote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of responsibility possible" and that "discrimination...is contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment" (DoD Directive 1350.2, Section D., paragraph 2). So while the problems of gangs and extremism that this report has been examining may at first sight appear to be somewhat unrelated to the question of equal opportunity, DoD policy is broad enough to encompass not only institutional forms of discrimination, but a range of interpersonal behaviors as well.

As such, EO policy is an appropriate and necessary supplement to the policies regarding enlistment standards, political activity and proper appearance (discussed above), if the military is to have a comprehensive approach to dealing with the problems of gangs and extremism. Indeed, the fact that both the Marine Corps Equal Opportunity Survey (MCEOS) and the Navy Equal Opportunity Sexual Harassment Survey (NEOSH) have recently begun to ask respondents about their experiences with gangs and/or extremist groups is a sign that EO personnel are already aware of the threat such groups can pose for the military's EO climate and are taking measures to respond to that threat. Still, in light of information already presented in this and other reports, a few specific points bear consideration:

1. In confronting the problem of extremism, the military needs to ensure that its measures help to alleviate rather than exacerbate the problem. As has been discussed in this report, many of today's young right-wing extremists perceive themselves as victims of society, with the perceived victimizers ranging from the federal government, to Jews, to Affirmative Action programs. Unfortunately, an ironic dilemma is that, while EO training provides an excellent opportunity to dispel the myths promulgated by the extremist right, an emphasis on EO issues might be perceived by extremists and would-be extremists as further evidence of "reverse discrimination" and "guilt-tripping" by the "liberal

establishment." On the other hand, the Armed Services Committee's Task Force report points out that EO training, as it is currently structured, is often "ineffective" and may consist "of little more than a slide presentation by a poorly trained individual" and that minorities "frequently report" the perception that promotion depends on involvement in the "good old boy" network. Thus, a further dilemma may be that, while some majority recruits feel threatened by a strong emphasis on EO training, many minority recruits feel threatened by the *lack* of a strong commitment to EO issues. In general, EO training seems an excellent place for developing the military's response to extremist groups and extremist ideology, but care should be taken to ensure that such training serves to dissipate, rather than reinforce, extremist tendencies among recruits.

2. Similarly, and relatedly, the gang problem has implications for the military's EO program. Like young right-wing extremists, many civilian gang members report that they see themselves as the victims of unfair treatment at the hands of institutional authorities, and that their gang membership is a solution to the problems of racism, injustice, and unequal access to socioeconomic rewards. In this connection, the Armed Services Committee Task Force's finding of widespread feelings among minority personnel that "groups of young blacks or other minorities [are perceived] as 'trouble'" by majority personnel, suggests that, even if most minority personnel are not yet involved in gangs, many feel threatened by racial stereotypes in the same way that civilian gang members report. Ironically, as the military steps up its efforts to combat the gang problem, the reported tendency of majority personnel to stereotype and mistrust groups of minority personnel could increase, and this could in turn generate a tendency among minority personnel to feel secure and comfortable only within their own ethnic groups. This suggests, then, that the military ought to approach the gang problem not only as a criminal issue, but as an EO climate issue, and efforts should be made to ensure that combating gangs does not translate into heightened ethnic isolation or hostility.

In short, while the problems of extremism and gangs pose unique challenges to the military's EO program, the response should not be to retreat from, but to reaffirm and strengthen, the Armed Service's commitment to equality of treatment and opportunity for all personnel. However, such renewed commitment may require some revision of EO training to include issues pertaining to extremism and gangs.

Research Efforts

This report has already mentioned, and in fact has drawn upon, a great deal of the military's current efforts to research the street gang and extremist group problems. Indeed, this report is itself a reflection of a portion of those efforts. However, there appear to be some gaps in the present research arsenal, and this section of this report will address those gaps and some proposals for filling them:

Gangs

There really is no existing systematic research into the scope and nature of the street gang problem as it affects the United States military. Whereas, as has been discussed, there have been

entire Task Forces devoted to extremist activity in the military, and to related problems like racism, discrimination, and general EO climate, and major reports have been released by these Task Forces, there has not yet been a comparable research effort devoted to the gang-military connection. The gang information handbooks put out by each of the Services generally amount to compilations of previous *civilian* research on gangs, and in some cases include a listing of incidents on or near military installations that are thought to be gang-related. However, to our knowledge, there is not as yet a source of information which can provide systematic data on such questions as:

1. The number and characteristics of military personnel known or thought to be involved with gangs;
2. The number of military applicants disqualified, and/or the number of personnel discharged, on the basis of gang involvement;
3. The extent to which military personnel perceive a gang problem in their units and/or the military as a whole;
4. The number of applicants who see the military as an escape from their civilian crime/gang activities;
5. The manner and extent to which gang activity affects force readiness and combat effectiveness; etc.

Fortunately, there are some signs that this research gap is in the process of being closed:

The MCEOS, as discussed above, has recently added questionnaire items which should help determine the scope and nature of gang (and extremist group) problems in the Marine Corps. Other EO climate surveys, such as the NEOSH, should consider adopting the new MCEOS gang items. This survey data ought to be supplemented with interview or focus group research so that more in-depth information can be gathered.

Navy briggs have been asking inmates about possible former gang involvement since about 1992. The Brig at Miramar, California, has amassed an extensive database of Life History Questionnaires filled out by inmates in Navy briggs around the country. A thesis project being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (Tierney 1998) promises to make further headway in this area, as well as to provide some rich primary data on how gang activity may affect the military acculturation process. This depth-interview study (n=35) of self-identified gang members in military briggs ought to shed light on such issues as the relationship between pre-service gang involvement and subsequent misbehavior, and the processes by which gang members may attempt to conceal their gang membership from recruiting and enlistment personnel. This research on incarcerated military personnel obviously needs to be supplemented with research on the possible gang involvements of non-incarcerated personnel.

Extremism

Compared to gang-military research, our knowledge of the scope and nature of extremist group activity in the military is much more complete. Moreover, the new additions to both the

MCEOS and the NEOSH Survey promise to enhance this knowledge. Nevertheless, this research on extremism has been largely limited to how the problem affects enlisted personnel, even though there are clear signs (some of which have been discussed in this report) that commissioned officers are not immune to involvement in extremist beliefs and even extremist groups. Indeed, from the perspective of national security, the association of military officers and former military officers with certain extremist groups and activities is arguably a more serious and dangerous problem than the activities of active-duty enlisted personnel. Furthermore, as was mentioned in the Congressional hearings on this matter, research is needed on the extent and nature of extremist activity in the National Guard, the Reserves, and even in the military's civilian work force. Recent reports by national media outlets on evidence of extremism at officer training Academies such as the Citadel, and among quasi-civilian organizations such as the State Guards and the Civilian Marksmanship Program, emphasize the need for research on how extremism affects elements of the military above and beyond active-duty enlisted personnel.

Enlistment

As has been discussed, the military has already made significant headway on the question of screening military applicants for possible connections to both street gangs and extremist groups. This report has been intended to supplement that work and will also provide recommendations on further actions which might be taken. However, tighter screening of applicants is only one way in which enlistment policy can contribute to reducing whatever problems with gangs and extremists the military might have. If, in colloquial terms, applicant screening is intended to keep the bad apples out of the military, it would seem that a necessary compliment to such an approach is to find ways to bring more good apples in. That is, even if it were possible to implement a perfect applicant screening program (and the preceding discussion suggests that the possibility is remote), there would still be enlistees who, though they show no indications of past gang or extremist involvement, could have the potential to become gang- or extremism-involved later on in their military careers. Thus, in addition to filtering the Armed Forces through enlistment screening, it is necessary to give some attention to diluting the influence of those malicious enlistees who unpredictably fall through the cracks.

Of course, the military has a wealth of systematically collected data on enlistees, including the social composition of enlistment cohorts, the enlistment propensity of contemporary youth, the effectiveness of various recruitment advertising campaigns, etc., and policy-makers are well-informed on the options at their disposal for improving the quantity as well as the quality of the enlisted force. However, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the depth of knowledge in this area, it is now known that the military has been having difficulties reaching optimal enlistee quantity and quality in recent years, and that the usual measures for responding to such a situation have so far not been effective. While these trends present something of a crisis in themselves, one may also see how they could exacerbate the gang and extremist problems this report has been examining: i.e., the more pressure there is on enlistment, the less likely it is that "bad apples" will be disqualified. Thus, more research is needed on why enlistment propensity is declining among contemporary youth, what kinds of measures can induce more high-quality youth (in terms of mental aptitude, moral character, and military commitment) to enlist, and how more potential enlisters can be "converted" into actual enlistees.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of this report has been to examine the feasibility of instituting and/or improving measures for screening enlisted personnel for involvement in street gangs and extremist groups. As such, the report considered research on gangs and extremists, past cases of gang and extremist activity in the military and possible future scenarios of such activity, and the military's current efforts to deal with these problems.

The overall conclusion from this examination is that, gang and extremist activity in the military is infrequent, and the military has generally done a commendable job of minimizing the threats posed by this activity. Nevertheless, as documented in this report and elsewhere, there have been some very serious past incidents and there is an increasing potential for danger to uniformed personnel and their dependents given the increasing levels of gang and extremist activity in American society.

Standardize Service Gang/Extremist Identification Policies and Procedures

Although each Service's unique demands dictate that they should have the final determination on screening personnel, it would be desirable to standardize policies and procedures for identifying members of gangs and extremist groups to the greatest extent possible. Recruiters and enlistment personnel currently must consult a wide array of Service-specific regulations and memoranda regarding such things as appearance, political activity, and uniform requirements, etc., in order to make decisions about individual military applicants. There is a need to determine whether certain current practices, whereby an applicant could be denied enlistment into one Service, yet admitted to another Service, are intended or the result of lack of information among recruiting personnel. As a specific example, an applicant with the number "88" (H is the eighth letter of the alphabet, thus "88" often signifies "Heil Hitler") tattooed on his/her body, might be denied enlistment in the Marine Corps--which specifically bans white supremacist markings--yet could be accepted into the Army--which bans only explicitly racist or obscene markings.

The Marine Corps presently has the most comprehensive set of policies relating to the screening of enlistees for ties to street gangs and extremist groups, and the other Services should consider adopting the Marine Corps' approach. They have developed procedures for coordinating the enlistee screening efforts of local recruiters, Service Counselors at MEPSs, and RTC commanders. Personnel in all these areas should have a clear understanding of DoD and Service policies with respect to enlistment standards, political/dissident activity, medical standards, and standards of dress and uniform regulations. Moreover, personnel in all these areas should have clear guidance about how to identify potential gang members and extremists, and explicit guidelines about what types of tattoos, brands, hair styles, other markings, etc. are unacceptable for military personnel. The general goal should be to eliminate the possibility that gang members and extremists can enlist in the military simply by applying to the least stringent Service, and to reduce whatever discrepancies may exist between policies relating to military applicants, and those which pertain to active-duty personnel. All Services should consider adopting uniform policies with respect to both applicants and active-duty personnel.

Consolidate “Gang Handbooks”

DoD should consider issuing a single “Gang Information Handbook” which would combine the most useful elements of the existing Service-specific gang manuals (i.e. AFOSI 1995; NCIS(CID) n.d.; U.S. Army (CIC) 1992). For example, while the Air Force and Navy manuals present lists of gang-related incidents in these respective services, the Army manual offers no such accounting. On the other hand, the Army manual contains a wealth of guidelines about the identification and control of gang activity and extremist activity, and personnel in other Services should have ready access to this kind of information. In our interviews with military personnel, a recurring theme was a desire for more education on the nature of the gang/extremist problem, and more comprehensive guidance on how to identify and make determinations about potential gang members and extremists.

The issuance of a single document or set of documents combining elements of the existing Service gang manuals would be a relatively simple matter, and would go a long way toward achieving these goals, as well as those mentioned above in regard to the coordination of screening efforts throughout the enlistment process. In general, screening efforts will be improved if all relevant military personnel are “on the same page” (literally and figuratively) with respect to the nature of gang and extremist problems, the resources at hand for identifying potential gang members and extremists, and the appropriate procedures to follow for determining the military suitability of particular individuals.

Internet/intranet Site for Gang/Extremist Information

A problem with the Gang Handbooks (whether consolidated or not), however, is that their format is limited in the amount of information they can provide, and how up-to-date this information can be. For example, both gang members and extremists, as this report has discussed, can and do rapidly change their appearances and other identifying characteristics. Moreover, the subcultural characteristics of street gangs and extremist groups can vary widely from one region to another. So while some of the existing gang manuals are hundreds of pages thick, they cannot possibly provide information such as the tattoo designs, hand signals, modes of operation, hair styles, alphabetical systems, etc. used by *all* the gangs and/or extremist groups with which recruitment and enlistment personnel may come into contact. Their hard copy format also means that it is difficult to up-date them as new information becomes available.

One solution to these problems would be to provide, in addition to the Gang Handbook(s), an electronically-accessible database of gang and extremist group information which military personnel could consult for up-to-date and/or localized guidance on identifying potential gang/extremist indicators. Currently, many civilian law enforcement agencies maintain web pages devoted to information about gang activity in their respective areas. These often include examples of tattoo designs, hand signals, graffiti, and other identification indicators associated with local gangs. It should be relatively easy to link these web pages (and others devoted to gang identification and control) to provide more localized information. The linkages would ensure currency since the website could be up-dated as new information becomes available to the participating civilian groups and law enforcement agencies. Such a site could also be linked with extremist web pages (e.g. White Aryan Resistance, Aryan Nations, Resistance Records, etc.) and with those of civilian “watchdog” groups (e.g. the Anti-Defamation

League, the Southern Poverty Law Center, etc.) so that military personnel could access further information on gangs and extremists in a highly efficient manner.

One question which arises, however, about this kind of website database, is whether the site would be accessible by the public at large, or if access would be limited to military and other authorized personnel only. As envisioned here, the website would contain already-public information, so the question does not really regard the sensitivity of the material, but rather the consequences of "broadcasting" the military's attempts to screen gang members and extremists during the enlistment process. On the one hand, it is conceivable that gang members and extremists could use the website's information in order to undermine the screening process (i.e. if it is known what is being looked for, one then knows what to conceal). On the other hand, if the general public becomes aware of the military's screening efforts, this may deter many gang members and extremists from even attempting to enlist. But whatever the consequences of a public (Internet) website devoted to the military's gang/extremist screening efforts, it would be wise to consider maintaining an intranet site accessible only by authorized military personnel in addition to, or instead of, a public Internet site. Such a site could contain more sensitive information, and might allow for the valuable exchange of information between recruitment and enlistment personnel about their experiences and questions with regard to identifying gang members and extremists. For example, accounts about actual military applicants could be contained there. In this way, an intranet site could be more interactive than a public Internet site. This report has already shown how computer technology can contribute to the spread of extremist activity in the military; a website such as the one(s) being proposed here could do much to curtail military problems with both extremist and gang activity.

Gang and Extremist Policy Task Force

One of the strongest conclusions to be drawn from the preceding report is that military personnel involved with recruitment and enlistment are in need of much more guidance with regard to DoD and Service policies dealing with gang and extremist activity. Indeed, the recommendations offered above all flow from that conclusion and are geared toward providing some of that guidance. However, although nearly every person we spoke with who is involved with enlistment and recruitment expressed a desire for more information and guidance, ours was not a systematic personnel survey. So while we are convinced that a problem along these lines does exist, it would be beneficial to get feedback about the problem from a wider range of individuals working in the Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), in the Recruiting Commands of the different services, as well as from individuals involved in the screening of recruits at RTCs. Thus, we recommend the formation of a task force to examine policies relating to gang and extremist activity in the military, and to gain a fuller understanding of recruiting and enlistment personnel concerns about the implementation and enforcement of these policies.

Our own research suggests that there are at least three main areas on which such a task force should focus:

USMEPCOM Policies

For example, current inspection of tattoos, and the processes by which tattoos are determined to be gang- and/or extremist-related, seems to occur on an almost improvisational basis. Recruiters and enlistment personnel try to use their best judgment and whatever knowledge they may have about tattoo designs to determine whether a particular applicant is suspicious or not. Blatantly racist or obscene markings (e.g. naked people, swear words, swastikas) seem to capture the attention of almost all such personnel, but there is wide variation in how less explicit markings are responded to. The recommendations presented above, if adopted, could go a long way toward increasing the breadth and depth of knowledge about gang and extremist identification, but there is also a need for a more firmly established protocol or procedure for identifying, and making determinations about potential gang members and extremists.

Moreover, tattoo inspection, along with a few questions asked during pre-enlistment and pre-accession interviews, seems to be the extent of current applicant screening devoted specifically to identifying gang members and extremists. A task force could explore other possible indicators of gang and extremist activity, including personality factors (such as authoritarianism discussed in this report), and biographical data measures used in other personnel screening arenas. In general, although it would have been desirable to present a design for additional screening measures in this report (e.g. a gang/extremist personality scale), we must instead recommend that a task force be formed to study these issues further. Specifically, we advise that the task force examine how whatever new screening measures are developed can be used in conjunction with existing adjudicative processes, such as "psych consults". As was discussed in this report, the "psych consult" offers one of the strongest opportunities for enhancing applicant screening. Currently, only a small number of applicants are referred to psychological evaluation, based largely on MEPS personnel's subjective impressions of "weird" or "suspicious behavior" among applicants. Thus, the task force should study ways of making this referral process more objective, and of gearing it specifically to the identification of gang members and extremists. MEPS personnel should receive specialized training in identifying indicators of extremist/gang behavior which may require further evaluation. Final determinations about military suitability should be made, as they are now, by psychology professionals.

Local law enforcement links

A gang and extremist policy task force could also examine the possibility of linking USMEPCOM with local law enforcement agency gang/extremist databases. A proposal along these lines was floated by personnel at the St. Louis MEPS in recent years, but no official action was taken on the proposal. Basically, the idea is that, local law enforcement agencies, which often maintain databases of known and suspected gang members in their area, could be linked with MEPS personnel so that the names of suspect military applicants could be checked against the law enforcement records. There are a number of logistical and legal difficulties with this however, including the fact that law enforcement agencies tend not to share the information in such files, and many of the individuals listed in them have never been convicted of any crime. Nevertheless, military law enforcement agents we interviewed for this report expressed interest in acting as liaisons between MEPCOM personnel and civilian law enforcement. More study is needed of how this type of arrangement could be put into place. As this report has shown, there

are a number of deficiencies with current criminal record checks for enlistees, and gaining access to law enforcement gang databases would certainly be an improvement.

Juvenile records access

A major barrier to effective screening of enlistees for gang and extremist ties is, as has been shown in this report and elsewhere, the extremely limited access to juvenile arrest and court records. Although recent efforts to persuade Congress to grant military officials special access to such records have been unsuccessful, there are signs that lawmakers could be convinced of the necessity of doing so in the future. For example, at the request of Dirk Kempthorne, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Personnel, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has recently initiated a review of "(1) the screening processes used by the military services to identify applicants who have criminal backgrounds and (2) the completeness of the sources of information used by the services...to screen applicants who may have criminal backgrounds" (Inspector General, DoD, "Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense [Personnel and Readiness]). Moreover, there is wide agreement among criminologists, law enforcement officials, and a range of other observers, that other aspects of the century-old Juvenile Court system require reexamination, especially in light of rising rates of juvenile crime and violence. Thus, the formation of a task force on gang and extremist military policies could be an important force in fomenting change in this area. The task force could join the effort to persuade Congress of the need for juvenile record access, and could also study ways of gaining such access through other than legislative means. For example, some recruiters have been very effective at persuading enlistees themselves to unseal their records; the task force could study these and other methods of enlarging the military's access to the criminal backgrounds of young military applicants.

Further Research

Finally, in addition to the concrete steps above, we have some recommendations to offer regarding further research on the scope and nature of the military's problems with gangs and extremism. As has been stressed throughout this report, policies designed to deal with gang members and extremists will be most effective when they are based on a solid foundation of systematic empirical observation and analysis. Currently, there exists more of such research on extremism in the military than on gangs in the military, but there is a need for further study in both areas.

For example, although this report has discussed RTCs as an important component of the enlistee screening process, there has been little or no research on the effectiveness of gang and extremist screening at such sites. It is known that about ten per cent of all recruits drop out of, or are separated from the military during basic training, but it is not known what percentage (if any) of this attrition is attributable to the identification of gang or extremist group involvement. It is also known that most troops receive some kind of emotional/psychological evaluation during basic training (e.g. the Air Force's AFMET and the Navy's NAVMET), but we are not aware of any analyses of how predictive such evaluations are of future gang or extremist involvement. Moreover, research is needed on how instruments used at the RTCs might be modified to specifically detect involvement in, or the propensity to become involved in, gangs and extremist

groups. In general, since the present report was focused on enlistee screening *per se*, it was beyond the scope of our research to examine in depth how RTCs figure into the gang member and extremist identification process. More research is required to assess how and whether enlistee screening processes can be extended to the basic training phase.

Relatedly, it would be very useful to expand on a research project mentioned earlier; namely, Tierney's (1998) work on the life histories of self-identified gang members in the military. That work has already generated some very interesting findings on the connections between gang membership and military acculturation problems, but the research sample (n=35) is too small and too limited (i.e. only Navy and Marine Corps personnel were sampled) for the findings to be generalizable or conclusive. Furthermore, that research only examined incarcerated personnel who identified themselves as gang members, so there is a need for research on non-incarcerated personnel as well. It is safe to assume that there are gang members and former gang members in the military who either have not committed any major offenses, or whose offenses have not been detected, and the life histories of these individuals may contain at least as much useful information as those of incarcerated military personnel. If research like Tierney's can help increase understanding of how gang membership often leads to acculturation problems, research on non-incarcerated personnel could shed light on how some gang members and/or former gang members are able to become successful military recruits. In general, more data need to be gathered on the relative risks involved in the accession of gang members, former gang members, and individuals at risk of becoming involved with gangs.

Lastly, we strongly recommend that the various Services attempt to coordinate their efforts to determine the scope and nature of gang and extremist problems in the military perhaps through use of the MEOC survey. Currently, the MCEOS contains the most comprehensive on-going survey measures of both gang and extremist activity in the Marine Corps. The NEOSH now surveys respondents about experiences with extremist activity, but not gang activity. The Army has conducted the most complete internal analysis of its problems with extremism, but has apparently not done the same with respect to gang activity. As has been argued in this report, the subtle threats posed by gangs and extremist groups to such things as unit cohesion, personnel morale, and interpersonal relations, can be just as detrimental to the military as blatant criminal and terrorist acts. Thus, "climate" surveys such as the MCEOS and the NEOSH have an important role to play in assessing the overall effects of gang and extremist activity on the military. By coordinating such efforts, policy makers will be in a better position to assess the scope and nature of gang and extremist problems throughout the military (including reserve and civilian components).

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Appendix A

Hate/Extremist Group Web Pages (WWW) URLs

Adolf Hitler Free Corps	http://www.voicenet.com/~cej2/assoc001.htm
Alpha Web Site	http://www.alpha.org
American Front	http://web2.airmail.net/bootboy/af.htm
American Whites	http://www.staffnet.com/us/aw.htm
Aryan Angel's White Pride Links	http://www.ryan.com/
Aryan Corps	http://204.181.176.4:80/stormfront/ryan-c.htm
Aryan Crusader's Library "Cyberhate"	http://www.io.com/~wlp/ryan-page
Aryan Female Homestead	http://www.whitepower.com/ryanfemale/
Aryan Liberation Army	http://www.alpha.ftcnet.com/~wolf8814/ala.html
Aryan Nations	http://www.stormfront.org/an.htm
Aryan News Agency	http://www.first-amendment.com/ana/
Aryan Preservation Society	http://www.cyberenet.net/~rahowa/society.html
Aryan Uprising	http://www.islandia.is/~rommel/ryan.htm
Bayou Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	http://198.69.82.120/PirateWeb/BayouKnightsKKK/
Be Wise as Serpents	http://www.iahushua.com/BeWise/bewise.html
Blut Und Ehre (Blood and Honor)	http://www.azstarnet.com/~mrblack/
Bootgirl88's Page	http://home.concentric.net/~Bootgirl/
Arthur R. Butz Web Page	http://pubweb.acus.nwu.edu/~abutz/
The Carolinian Lords of the Caucasus	http://www.io.com/~wlp/ryan-page/cloc/
Charlemagne Hammer Skinheads	http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2142/
Christian Defense League	http://home.inreach.com/dov/cdl.htm
Christian Holocaust	http://www.blackplague.org/holocaust/
Christian Identity Network	http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3518
Christian Kinsmen Covenant Peoples Web Page	http://www.soltec.net/~markr/
Christian White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	http://www.angelfire.com/ak/christianwhiteknight/index.html
Christianity Home Page	http://www.sinet.it/Islam/christ/index.htm
Citizen Forum Homepage	http://www.primenet.com/~jahred/forum.html
Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust (CODOH)	http://www.codoh.com
Confederate White Pride	http://home.earthlink.net/~aryanresist/
Creators Rights Party	http://www.christiangallery.com/creator.html
David Duke Report	http://www.duke.org/

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Ernst Zundel's Voice of Freedom Site (Zundelsite)	http://www.zundel.com/
Euro-Christian Defence League	http://www.ftcnet.com/~freedom/ecdl/index.html
Fear of a Third World Planet	http://home.eznet.net/~rmack/
Fourth Reich	http://www.ns88.bayside.net/revolution/
Friends of Freedom	http://alpha.ftcnet.com:80/~cfs1/fof0795.htm
Greg Raven's Revisionist Archive (Institute for Historical Review)	http://www.kaiwan.com/~greg.ihr
Heritage Front	http://www.pathcom.com/~freedom/hf
Holy War (The Christian Brotherhood)	http://www.abbc.com/holywar/
Imperial Klans of America	http://www.kkkk.net
Imperium	http://www.ariskkamp.com/imperium/
Independent History and Research	http://www.hoffman-info.com/
Independent White Racialists Leaderless Resistance	http://home.pacbell.net/daren88/
International Jewish Conspiracy	http://www.angelfire.com/co/7thunders/zion.html
Invisible Empire - Pennsylvania United Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	http://web.raex.com/~moezif/
The Jewish Conspiracy FAQ	http://www.netaxs.com/~balpert/jewfaq.html
Jew World Empire	http://www.geocities.com/HotSprings/9426/empire.html
kkk.com	http://www.kkk.com
Ku Klux Klan's Home Page	http://www.k-k-k.com/
Library of a White Tribalist	http://www.nb.net/~newdawn/library.html
The Lighthouse	http://www.sodak.net/~thelighthouse/index.htm
Maryland Christian Nationalist Page	http://home1.gte.net/nri/revwhite/
Melchizedek Vigilance	http://www.melvig.org/mel/MELVIG.HTM
Micetrap's O.J. Simpson Pages	http://www.execpc.com/~strmfrnt/simpson.html
Militant Knights of the KKK	http://www.mindspring.com/~awol/scross.html
Minneapolis Skinhead Page	http://www.usinternet.com/users/sonic88/home.html
Missouri Confererate Battle Front	http://www.angelfire.com/mo/Granddragon/
Misogyny Unlimited	http://www.ozemail.com.au/~ksolway/misogyny.html
MSR-Leaderless Resistance	http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2588/
Nation of Europa	http://www.demon.co.uk/natofeur/
National Alliance	http://www.natall.com

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National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP)	http://angelfire.com/fl/naawp4usa/
National Party	http://www.cyberg8t.com/natlprty/
National Socialist Battle Front	http://www.angelfire.com/ne/nsbattlefront/main.html
National Socialist for Life	http://www.glasscity.net/users/stein/reich.html
National Socialist Movement	http://alpha.ftcnet.com/~schlis/aryan.html
National Socialist Primer	http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1185/nsprimer.html
National Socialist Student Union	http://diamond.nb.net/~newdawn/nssu.html
National Socialist Vanguard	http://www.alpha.org/nsv/
National Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP)	http://www.nswpp.org
NSWPP-Southwest Region	http://www.io.com/~claudius/
Nazism Now	http://www.celticenterprises.com/nazi
Negroid Research Institute	http://homel.gte.net/nri.html
New Dawn	http://www.nb.net/~newdawn/
New Jersey Skinheads Page	http://members.gnn.com/misfitx/skin2.htm
New Order	http://alpha.ftcnet.com/~skinhds/neworder/
New Order Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	http://www.angelfire.com/ca/neworderknights/index.html
Niterider Homepage America's Invisible Empire KKK	http://www.airnet.net/niterider/
Northwest Kinsmen Homepage	http://www.concentric.net/~nwk
Occidental Pan-Aryan Crusader	http://www.c2.net/~crusader/
Occupied America	http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepage/america/
Official Ku Klux Klan Home Page	http://shell.idt.net/~edoneill/kkkhome.html
Operation Ghetto Storm	http://www.whitepower.com/ghettostorm http://www.whitepride.com/ghettostorm
Oregon Knights of the Ku Klux Klan	http://home.cdsnet.net/~wotan/main.htm
Our Hero's Library	http://www.ftcnet.com/~ourhero
Pan-Aryan Resource Center	http://members.tripod.com/~Brian_R/index.html
Plunder & Pillage	http://www.excaliber.com/thor/pillage.htm
Politically Incorrect	http://www.smartnet.net/~fenix/
Politics and Terrorism	http://www.litenup.com/~politics/index2.html
Posse Comitatus	http://www.webexpert.net/posse/default.html
Pride, Power and Preservation	http://www.capecod.net/~ndemonti/
Progressive Liberty Party	http://www.sover.net/~owlshead/

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Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion (Be Wise As Serpents)	http://www.iahushua.com/BeWise/protocol.html
Racetractor Home Page	http://www.postfun.com/racetractor/
Racially Conscious in Boston	http://www.tiac.net/users/hatred/
Radio Freedom	http://alpha.ftcnet.com/~freedom/r-free.index.html
Resistance Records	http://www.resistance.com/
Revisionist Productions	http://www.eskimo.com/~ralphi/
Sacto Skinheads Hatepage	http://www.home.earthlink.net/~odin88/
Scriptures for America	http://www.logoplex.com/shops/sfa/
SKIN-NET	http://ftcnet.com/~skinhds/main.htm http://alpha.ftcnet.com:80/~skinhds/
Skinheads U.S.A.	http://alpha1.iad5w.net/~bootboy/main.htm
S.S. Enterprise's Home Page	http://www.qhis.net/~whiteboy/
Stormfront BBS	http://bbs.stormfront.org
Stormfront-White Nationalist Page	http://www.stormfront.org/
Student Revisionists' Resource Site	http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~lpauling/
Thunder 88's Für das Vaterland	http://www.concentric.net/~14words/odessa.html
The Truth at Last	http://ns3.maco.net/~jeffw/
Turner Diaries	http://members.aol.com/eturner88/Turner_Diaries/index.html
U.S. Skins Page	http://members.tripod.com/~nordie/main.htm
Voice of White America	http://members.aol.com/tsaukki/whiteamr.htm
Volksfront	http://www.aracnet.com/~intim1/ http://members.gnn.com/intim1/warn.htm
Wake Up or Die	http://www.wakeupordie.com/
The Watchman	http://www2.stormfront.org/watchman/index.html
Weisman Publications	http://www.seek-info.com/
Western Imperative Network	http://www.usaor.com/users/ipm/
White Aryan Resistance Hate Page	http://www.resist.com/
White Aryan Resistance Information Center of Northern California	http://www.oro.net/~smokey/war
White Christian Nation	http://www.white-christian-nation.org/index.html
White Internet Nationalists	http://members.tripod.com/~bootboy/index.html
White Power Central	http://www.blackplague.org/mindslayer
White Power Generation	http://www.users.interport.net/~akreye/tm2.html
White Pride World Wide	http://wpww.com

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White Unity Party	http://www.alpha.org/wup/wup.html
Women for Aryan Unity	http://www.natall.com/aryan-page/wau/wau_index.html
World Chuch of the Creator	http://www.creator.org/
World Wide Library of Freedom	http://trendi.com/~phoenix
World-Wide WhitePower	http://www.whitepower.com/
Yggdrasil's Library	http://www.ddc.net/ygg/

Appendix B

Hate/Extremist Newsgroups (USENET)

alt.activism
alt.conspiracy
alt.fan.ernst-zundel
alt.flame.niggers
alt.music.white-power
alt.nswpp
alt.politics.nationalism.white
alt.politics.white-power
alt.revisionism
alt.revolution.american.second
alt.revolution.counter
alt.skinheads
alt.skinheads.moderated
misc.activism.militia
soc.org.kkk

Hate/Extremist Internet Relay Channels (IRCs)

#WhiteNation
#White_power
#aryan
#nazi, #Nazi
#kkk, #KKK
#WIN
#aryan_nation
#!!!!!!!
#whitepower
#skins88
#skinheads, #Skinheads
#racial_identity
#Aryan_Women
#antichristnet
#SSCA
#Patriot
#NSWPP
#white-power
#88
#NS_Nation
#Hammerskin_Nation

Appendix C

Extremist Electronic Bulletin Board Systems (BBS)

Aryan Resistance Center	(916) 944-8036 #22 (formerly WAR BBS)
Banished	(503) 232-6566; (503) 239-5049
Be Wise as Serpents	(808) 456-4740
Cyberspace Minuteman	(312) 275-6362
Digital Freedom BBS	(416) 462-3327; (416) 465-4767
Michigan Militia	(810) 693-6012
Nevada Volunteer Militia	(615) 744-9924
Our Nation	(909) 624-8474
Patience, Tolerance, Hate, Revenge	(215) 949-0689
Stormfront	(407) 833-4986 or telnet
White Resurgence BBS	(314) 230-3179

Appendix D

“Watchdog” Groups

Anti-Defamation League	Http://www.adl.org/
Anti-Racist Action	Http://www.web.apc.org/~ara/
Computerusers Against Racist Expression (C.A.R.E.)	Http://www.pi.net/~enclos/eng_care.html
Cyberwatch	Http://www.wiesenthal.com/watch/index.html
Dial-A-Nazi	Http://www.jdo.org/nazifighter.html
Extremist Groups [DoD Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute]	Http://www.pafb.af.mil/deomi/ext.htm
FTR Action Kit - They Fight the Right	Http://qrd.tcp.com/qrd/www/FTR/theyfigh.html
The Hate Directory	Http://www.bcpl.lib.md.us/~rfrankli/hatedir.htm#NATSOCWHI
HateWatch	Http://hatewatch.org/index.html
Internet Racism Discussion Board	Http://www.sunflower.org/~mkking/webboard/index.html
Jerusalem One Network - Fight Against Hate	Gopher://gopher.jer1.co.il/
Militia Links	Http://www.sff.net/people/pitman/m1.htm
Nizkor Project (Ken McVay)	Http://www.nizkor.org/ and http://www.almanac.bc.ca/
QLJ - Fighting Net Hate	Http://www.vir.com/~andymon/nethate.html
Responding to Violent Extremism	Http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~timothyn/scholar/extremism.htm
Simon Wiesenthal Center	Http://www.wiesenthal.com
Southern Poverty Law Center-Klanwatch	Http://www.splcenter.org
Stop the Hate	Http://www.tcac.com/~steveb/stophate.html
Yad Vashem	Http://yvs.shani.net

Appendix E

Gang Information Sites

1995 National Youth Gang Survey	http://www.ncjrs.org/1995survey/survey
A Community Comparison of "Youth Gang" Prevention Strategies	http://www.ncrel.org/sdrs/areas/issues/envrnmnt/drugfree/v1takata.htm
Air Assault CID Gang Extremist Homepage	http://www.vrhome.com/slammer/gang/
California Gang Investigator's Association	www.hitech.com/cgia/html
Eastern Washington Univ. CJ Majors Gangs List	http://www.class.ewu.edu/CJ/gangs.htm
Fremont PD: Mike Nottoli: Children and Gangs	http://www.citywideweb.com/fremont/fpdgngs.html
GSSDIRS Home Page	http://taren.ns.net/ag/gangs/pg15to26.htm#whtrends
GANGS 2000	http://taren.ns.net/ag/gangs/gangs.htm
Gang Identity	128.120.140.1/gangID/default.html
Gangs in Los Angeles County	http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~aalonso/Gangs/
Gang Prevention Links	http://goldmine.cde.ca.gov/spbranch/safety/ganglinks.html
Gangs	http://www.ci.torrance.ca.us/city/dept/police/gangs.htm
Gang-Related Web Links – Urban Safety Wayne State University – Detroit	http://www.cus.wayne.edu/u_safety/gangs.html
Gang Signs	www.courses.edu/gang-signs.html
Gang Signs and Graffiti	http://www.xmission.com/~gastown/up-oll/gang-guide.html
Gangsta Vision Resource Library	http://www.gangstavision.com/info.html
Graffiti	http://www.courses.edu/graffit.html
Illinois State Police - Gang Home Page	http://www.state.il.us/isp/gng000hp.htm
Illinois State Police - Street Gang Graffiti	http://www.state.il.us/ISP/gng00007.htm
Justice Information Center (NCJRS): Juvenile Justice Documents – Gangs	http://www.ncjrs.org/gangsu.htm
Juvenile Crime Research Page	www.frii.com/~diverdi/debate/juvip/index.html
Juvenile Slang	http://www.wco.com/~aerick/juv.htm

Mothers Against Gangs Program	http://www.winternet.com/~jannmart/nkcmag.html
Multi-Agency Gang Task Force	http://www.magforce.org/
National Youth Gang Center (NYGC)	http://www.iir.com/nygc/nygc.htm#Task1
National Youth Gang Center Bibliography of Gang Literature	http://www.ncjrs.org/gangbi.htm
Novagate Gang Awareness Page	http://www.novagate.com/novasurf/gang.html
Research Reviews: Gang Violence and Prevention	http://coopext.cahe.wsu.edu/~sherfey/issue4c.htm
SocioRealm - Gang Violence	http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Quad/5889/gangs.htm
Street Gang Awareness	http://www.bookpage.com/webboard/nonfiction-messages/97.html